Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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200 Chapter 6. Integrity-Preserving Communications cluded in the process of shortcut assignment. By adding some tolerance to the number of hops the token travels between assignments, the assignment can be balanced such that all nodes will eventually serve as shortcuts to the same number of other nodes. There are two major problems with this approach. First, the number of messages that have to travel through the network is very big. A ring can be easily constructed based on a spanning tree, for example using an Echo algorithm, which however leads to a rather inefficient ring structure. For n nodes in the network, such a spanning tree contains n − 1 edges and therefore the corresponding ring contains approximately 2n edges. In the optimal case, the ring has n − 1 edges, but such a ring is hard to construct. Since each token has to travel along each edge once, in total between roughly n 2 and 2n 2 messages have to be transmitted. A related problem is the fact that each node has to process at least n messages in total. The second problem is the distribution of shortcut nodes. With the described approach, an even distribution of shortcut nodes cannot be guaranteed. A more efficient assignment of shorcut nodes, which also provides an even shortcut node distribution, is based on a controlled selection process. Each node X partitions the network in nS geographical regions and sends a request to the center of each of these regions. The regions have to be constructed in a way such that with one shortcut node in each region, full coverage is provided. By construction, this approach provides an even distribution of the shortcut nodes. Its scalability is also improved compared to the token ring approach. Each node sends nS request messages, receives the same amount of responses, and each message travels about L hops (average path length in the network). Thus, in total 2nnSL messages are sent. 6.5.3 Long-Range Interleavings In very large networks, it may be impossible to achieve full coverage with a limited number nS of shortcuts and a given δ as a message may not be able to reach the δ-neighbourhood of its destination with a single shortcut. However, there might be another node, which is already part of the message path, that has a shortcut in the δ area of the target, or at least closer to it than the previous one. Thus, while a message travels on its path to its destination, additional shortcuts can be used to span the complete distance to the δ-region of the destination. This idea is depicted in Figure 6.22. Here, two additional shortcuts are being used in order to get the message closer to the target G. The authentication links “monitor” each other: The link between B and E ensures that the message is
6.5. Extended Interleaved Authentication 201 not manipulated either by C, D, or any other intermediate node. The last piece of the path is bridged with Canvas. A B C D E F G Figure 6.22: A path with long-range interleaved authentication There is a simple rule according to which the nodes on a path act: Try to attach a long-range authentication code, i.e. a shortcut, that gets closer to the target than the previous one. At any given time, there are zero, one, or two shortcuts attached to a message. There may be a primary and a secondary shortcut. When the message starts off from the source, it has only one such shortcut, which is the primary shortcut. Following nodes on the path look for own shortcuts that are more closely located to the target than the primary shortcut. If a node finds one, it attaches a corresponding MAC to the message, which becomes the secondary shortcut. If there are two shortcuts already attached to a message and a path node finds a closer shortcut than the secondary one, the secondary shortcut is substituted by this new one. When the message gets closer to the destination, all shortcut MACs will be gradually removed and the message is confined to Canvas authentication. The function to substitute or add a shortcut authentication code, subst-shortcut, is captured in Algorithm 6. Part of the input is a “list” of authentication code, γ, which has either zero or one elements. This list does not reflect the primary shortcut of the message, which is targeted at B, but may only contain the secondary shortcut if it exists. If γ is empty and a shortcut node can be found that is closer to the destination than B is, a secondary shortcut for the message is created. If a seondary shortcut already exists but a “better” one is found, i.e. one that is even closer to the destination P, the existing secondary shortcut is discarded and a new one is created. Note that the function find-closest-shortcut is not further detailed here. It simply returns the shortcut node of the current node that is closest to P. Table 6.5 defines the rules for long-range interleaved authentication. The rule shortcut-authenticate-and-forward applies if the current node X is the primary shortcut of the message. It is checked whether the primary shortcut authentication code is correct and whether the Canvas protocol is adhered to. This rule demands that a secondary shortcut exists for this message (condition len(γ) ≥ 1). This becomes the new primary shortcut for the message, and a new secondary shortcut is attached if one is found. To that end, the function substshortcut is invoked, which either creates a new shortcut authentication code
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Diss. ETH Nr. 18174 Protocols for S
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ii often ad hoc and transient natur
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iv Dieses Ziel kann durch kryptogra
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Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Backg
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Contents ix 3.3.1 Basic Assumptions
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Contents xi 6.3 Performance Evaluat
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Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Backgrou
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1.3. Contributions 3 on the other h
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1.4. Thesis Outline 5 • Mario Str
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Chapter 2 Wireless Sensor Networks
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2.1. Applications of Wireless Senso
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2.1. Applications of Wireless Senso
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2.2. Sensor Node Characteristics 13
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2.3. Related Network Types 21 zero,
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2.3. Related Network Types 23 • P
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2.3. Related Network Types 25 PAN,
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2.4. Related Device Types 27 in con
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2.4. Related Device Types 29 ports
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2.5. Sensor Network Models 31 both
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2.5. Sensor Network Models 33 are a
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2.6. Simulation of Sensor Networks
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2.7. Security Requirements 41 terac
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2.7. Security Requirements 43 netwo
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2.7. Security Requirements 45 acces
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2.7. Security Requirements 47 2.7.6
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2.7. Security Requirements 49 of te
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2.8. Cryptography for Sensor Networ
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2.9. Existing Approaches to Wireles
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Chapter 3 A Security Model for Wire
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3.1. Attack Paths 67 field (cf. [17
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3.1. Attack Paths 69 modules [63].
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3.1. Attack Paths 71 closed environ
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3.2. Attack Objectives 73 • Timel
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3.2. Attack Objectives 75 Critical
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3.2. Attack Objectives 77 Actors A
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 79 a
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 81 c
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 83 p
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3.4. The Cost of End-to-End Securit
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3.4. The Cost of End-to-End Securit
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3.5. Approximating End-to-End Secur
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3.7. Summary 95 Location-constraine
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Chapter 4 Key Establishment Shared
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4.2. Random Key Pre-Distribution 99
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4.3. Key Agreement Based on Hash Ch
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4.4. Multiple Hash Chains for Key A
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4.4. Multiple Hash Chains for Key A
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4.5. Strengthening Random Key Pre-D
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4.6. Related Work 123 pc = 0.33 Du-
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4.6. Related Work 125 Probability o
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4.7. Summary 127 The security of th
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Chapter 5 Multipath Communication T
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5.1. Principles of Multipath Commun
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5.2. Routing on Spanning Trees 133
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5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 141 b
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5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 143 a
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5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 145 n
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5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 147 F
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Page 193 and 194: 6.4. Security Evaluation 179 Bandwi
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Page 197 and 198: 6.4. Security Evaluation 183 Number
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Page 201 and 202: 6.4. Security Evaluation 187 Paths
Page 203 and 204: 6.4. Security Evaluation 189 ity of
Page 205 and 206: 6.4. Security Evaluation 191 of the
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Page 223 and 224: 6.7. Applications 209 Psi 1 0.8 0.6
Page 225 and 226: 6.7. Applications 211 codes are att
Page 227 and 228: 6.7. Applications 213 domain. The r
Page 229 and 230: 6.9. Summary 215 simulations and by
Page 231 and 232: Chapter 7 Conclusion This work prop
Page 233 and 234: 7.1. Secure Communication in Wirele
Page 235 and 236: 7.2. Future Work 221 7.1.4 Shortcut
Page 237 and 238: Bibliography [1] Specification of t
Page 239 and 240: Bibliography 225 1st European Works
Page 241 and 242: Bibliography 227 [41] Rohan Chitrad
Page 243 and 244: Bibliography 229 [64] L. Eschenauer
Page 245 and 246: Bibliography 231 [85] Yahoo! Inc. D
Page 247 and 248: Bibliography 233 [105] Kristof Van
Page 249 and 250: Bibliography 235 [126] Anne Marie M
Page 251 and 252: Bibliography 237 [150] Sylvia Ratna
Page 253 and 254: Bibliography 239 [172] Thanos Stath
Page 255 and 256: Bibliography 241 [192] Eric W. Weis
Page 257: Curriculum Vitae Harald Vogt Person
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