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Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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4.2. Random Key Pre-Distribution 105<br />

The l<strong>in</strong>k keys def<strong>in</strong>e the authentication graph that exists “on top” of the<br />

communication graph, <strong>in</strong> which the edges are determ<strong>in</strong>ed by radio connectivity.<br />

(The vertices of both graphs correspond to the sensor nodes.) If we allow<br />

l<strong>in</strong>k keys only between nodes that are spatially close, i.e. between which exists<br />

a radio l<strong>in</strong>k, the authentication graph is a subgraph of the communication graph.<br />

If we also allow l<strong>in</strong>k keys between remote nodes, the edgeds <strong>in</strong> the authentication<br />

graph become arbitrarily distributed, be<strong>in</strong>g constra<strong>in</strong>ed only by the ability<br />

of pairs of nodes to establish l<strong>in</strong>k keys. In the <strong>for</strong>mer case, the authentication<br />

graph is geometric, while <strong>in</strong> the latter case, it is closer to a random graph.<br />

Nodes with few neighbours may not be able to connect to any neighbour at<br />

all. A small number of nodes be<strong>in</strong>g disconnected from the ma<strong>in</strong> component of<br />

the network should not pose a problem <strong>in</strong> practice. As a matter of fact, it can<br />

be expected that some nodes will fail to function dur<strong>in</strong>g the course of normal<br />

operation, and the network will have to deal with such failures anyway. Some<br />

application scenarios may depend on a network that is densely connected, with<br />

each node hav<strong>in</strong>g many neighbours to talk to. For other scenarios, a lightly<br />

connected network may suffice. It is part of deployment plann<strong>in</strong>g to determ<strong>in</strong>e<br />

the necessary and economically feasible density of the network.<br />

A random predistribution scheme yields a certa<strong>in</strong> probability pc with which<br />

two nodes are able to establish a l<strong>in</strong>k key. This probability depends both on<br />

the key pool size and the key r<strong>in</strong>g size. While the key r<strong>in</strong>g size is usually<br />

constra<strong>in</strong>ed by the available memory <strong>in</strong> the nodes, the size of the key pool can<br />

be varied arbitrarily, s<strong>in</strong>ce it exists <strong>in</strong> full only <strong>in</strong> the key distribution center.<br />

As def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> section 4.2.1, let S be the key pool size and m the number<br />

of root keys <strong>in</strong> a node’s key r<strong>in</strong>g. In order to determ<strong>in</strong>e the probability pc,<br />

we first determ<strong>in</strong>e the probability with which two nodes share exactly i keys<br />

(0 ≤ i ≤ m), which is<br />

Pr[i shared] =<br />

S S−i<br />

i<br />

2(m−i) 2(m−i) m−i<br />

S 2<br />

m<br />

<br />

(4.1)<br />

Chan et al. [39] have given a derivation of this expression. Here, we give a<br />

slightly modified explanation of its terms. The numerator designates the number<br />

of possibilities to select two key r<strong>in</strong>gs which have exactly i common ele-<br />

ments:<br />

• We assume i common keys. There are S i ways to select i items from the<br />

key pool.<br />

• There are m − i dist<strong>in</strong>ct keys left to be drawn <strong>for</strong> each node from the key<br />

pool, so 2(m − i) keys <strong>in</strong> total. The i keys that already have been deter-

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