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Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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160 Chapter 6. Integrity-Preserv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Communication</strong>s<br />

possible to authenticate the altered message with regard to the orig<strong>in</strong>al statement<br />

of orig<strong>in</strong>.<br />

6.1.2 Identity, Integrity, and Authentication <strong>in</strong> WSNs<br />

Identities of nodes <strong>in</strong> a communication network may exist on different system<br />

levels. For example, serial numbers or structured, unique addresses such as<br />

the 6-byte MAC layer identifiers used <strong>in</strong> Ethernet networks, simple random<br />

numbers (with a high probability of uniqueness), or public/private key pairs are<br />

be<strong>in</strong>g used. Often, identities are the foundation <strong>for</strong> security measures such as<br />

access control, which could be based <strong>for</strong> example on ID filter<strong>in</strong>g or public key<br />

signatures.<br />

The key distribution schemes of Chapter 4 assume that a (random) identifier<br />

exists <strong>for</strong> each node. This identifier is used to create a pseudo-random number<br />

sequence that determ<strong>in</strong>es, which keys are assigned to a node. Additionally,<br />

the assigned subset of keys can also be considered as an identifier <strong>for</strong> a node,<br />

although it is only unique with a certa<strong>in</strong> probability. However, a key subset<br />

has the advantage that its validity can be checked by other parties by test<strong>in</strong>g<br />

whether the node actually knows the keys that have been assigned to it. In fact,<br />

the major purpose of this k<strong>in</strong>d of identifier is not to corroborate some unique<br />

name <strong>for</strong> each node, but to prove that the node is legitimately participat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />

the sensor network.<br />

As mentioned above, the knowledge of the identity of a message’s source<br />

does not imply any trust <strong>in</strong> that source or the truthfulness of a message’s content<br />

that is attributed to that source. This trust has to be established through<br />

some means that is usually outside of the scope of a direct communication relationship.<br />

In a WSN, trust is usually assumed based on the fact that nodes<br />

belong to the same WSN deployment, or are operated with<strong>in</strong> the same adm<strong>in</strong>istrative<br />

doma<strong>in</strong>. Membership <strong>in</strong> the same deployment can be established, as<br />

mentioned <strong>in</strong> the previous paragraph, by us<strong>in</strong>g a key predistribution scheme.<br />

Alternatively, a list of valid identifiers could be predistributed to all nodes, or<br />

certificates could be used.<br />

A system where trust is assumed if a valid key set is presented may be vulnerable<br />

to the so-called Sybil attack [58]. This attack is based on the creation<br />

of new identities. By recomb<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the key sets of captured nodes, new key sets<br />

can be created, which can then be used to simulate a potentially large number<br />

of virtual (fake) nodes and <strong>in</strong>fluence the result of a WSN’s operation. An <strong>in</strong>trusion<br />

detection system [137] may help to detect such virtual identities, but it<br />

may <strong>in</strong>volve a significant overhead.

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