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Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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6.5. Extended Interleaved Authentication 195<br />

messages are correct. With more nodes be<strong>in</strong>g compromised, this rate quickly<br />

falls. This is due to the fact that the “doors” <strong>in</strong> this scenario are a bottleneck<br />

through which all messages have to pass. If the attacker happens to select<br />

nodes <strong>in</strong> such an area, all messages from the respective room will be subject to<br />

manipulation.<br />

6.5 Extended Interleaved Authentication<br />

The simple Canvas scheme provides basic protection aga<strong>in</strong>st message manipulations<br />

that are carried out <strong>in</strong> unstructured attackes. But a highly structured<br />

attack, such as a partition<strong>in</strong>g attack, can render the Canvas scheme <strong>in</strong>effective.<br />

We will now show that by <strong>in</strong>troduct<strong>in</strong>g shortcuts <strong>in</strong> the authentication graph,<br />

structured attacks can be mitigated as well. They effectively <strong>for</strong>ce the attacker<br />

to become active (i.e. compromise nodes) <strong>in</strong> the close vic<strong>in</strong>ity of the target<br />

location.<br />

6.5.1 Protocol Description<br />

We describe here a protocol that extends the basic Canvas scheme, i.e. all<br />

checks that are made when us<strong>in</strong>g Canvas only are made here as well. The<br />

extended protocol provides an additional layer of security that specifically addresses<br />

the weakness of Canvas that a cluster of compromised nodes can manipulate<br />

all messages that pass through nodes <strong>in</strong> this cluster.<br />

The proposed scheme extends the basic Canvas scheme <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

way. Each node ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s a (small) number of security relationships with<br />

nodes that are not with<strong>in</strong> its k-hop neighbourhood but distributed throughout<br />

the whole network. These long-range l<strong>in</strong>ks are used <strong>for</strong> authenticat<strong>in</strong>g messages<br />

that are sent to remote locations. Hav<strong>in</strong>g a direct security relationship<br />

between the source of the message and a node that is close to the receiver,<br />

large, potentially compromised, parts of the network can be bypassed. An attacker<br />

will only be able to tamper with messages if he is active with<strong>in</strong> close<br />

range of the receiv<strong>in</strong>g node.<br />

The long-range security relationships of nodes will be called “shortcuts”,<br />

and the remote peer of a node will be called a “shortcut node”. The security of<br />

this extended scheme is based on two pr<strong>in</strong>ciples:<br />

1. If the distance between the sender of a message and its target location is<br />

less than δ, i.e. d(A,P) ≤ δ, it is sufficient to Canvas-authenticate the<br />

message. This is based on the consideration that if the attacker is active<br />

<strong>in</strong> the vic<strong>in</strong>ity of the target location, there is a certa<strong>in</strong> probability that

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