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Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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220 Chapter 7. Conclusion<br />

ments are overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g and such a system would be very much constra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong><br />

its flexibility to accomodate extensions to the network.<br />

Our approach to secure communication relies on the availability of shared<br />

keys only between nodes that are <strong>in</strong> close proximity to each other. This limits<br />

the overhead <strong>for</strong> key storage considerably. The Canvas scheme proposed <strong>in</strong><br />

this work requires that each node shares a key with each of its one- to k-hop<br />

neighbours (k ≥ 2). In a typical deployment sett<strong>in</strong>g with k = 2, this would<br />

require each node to store about 10 to 20 keys, which sensor nodes are well<br />

capable of. A message that is about to be transmitted to a remote node is authenticated<br />

by the source us<strong>in</strong>g at least two keys, which are shared with the<br />

follow<strong>in</strong>g nodes on the communication path. This requires only m<strong>in</strong>or adjustments<br />

on the rout<strong>in</strong>g layer, namely a look-ahead of k nodes on the rout<strong>in</strong>g path.<br />

The same authentication pattern is repeatedly applied by all nodes on the path.<br />

The protection provided by such a scheme is able to render s<strong>in</strong>gle compromised<br />

nodes <strong>in</strong>effective. A message is authenticated by at least two authentication<br />

codes, but only one of them can be manipulated by the compromised node,<br />

thus any change <strong>in</strong> the message’s content would be discovered by the next node<br />

on the path. At that po<strong>in</strong>t, the network would become aware of the attack –<br />

someth<strong>in</strong>g an attacker wants to avoid as this degrades the trust <strong>in</strong> the network,<br />

which also degrades the value of the attack.<br />

This <strong>in</strong>terleav<strong>in</strong>g of message authentication codes corresponds to creat<strong>in</strong>g<br />

multiple <strong>in</strong>dependent authentication paths, i.e. paths on which authentication<br />

<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation is passed. With k = 2, Canvas creates two such paths. Thus it is<br />

able to accomodate compromised nodes on both paths that are not adjacent to<br />

each other on the communication path. Canvas is similar to hav<strong>in</strong>g two physically<br />

disjo<strong>in</strong>t communication paths <strong>in</strong> the regard that a s<strong>in</strong>gle compromised<br />

path cannot break the authentication. Additionally, Canvas gives the advantage<br />

that both paths are <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>ked and break<strong>in</strong>g both of them requires a certa<strong>in</strong><br />

configuration of compromised nodes.<br />

The Canvas scheme has a limited reach <strong>in</strong> that only isolated compromised<br />

nodes can be countered. As soon as the attacker manages to subvert clusters<br />

of nodes, the scheme becomes partially <strong>in</strong>effective. Any message that passes<br />

through a pair of compromised nodes would be subject to manipulation. In<br />

order to counter certa<strong>in</strong> attack patterns, it is there<strong>for</strong>e necessary to <strong>in</strong>troduce<br />

long-distance authentication relationships.

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