Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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168 Chapter 6. Integrity-Preserving Communications discussed later in this chapter, a finite value of δ can limit the impact of compromised nodes without losing reachability. The rule direct-accept-and-forward is applied when the current node does not qualify as a receiver of the message (since it is too far away from the destination), the destination is within a distance of δ, and Canvas authentication is successful. If these conditions are fulfilled, attestations are created and the message is forwarded. The rule direct-accept-and-process on the other hand is applied when the current node qualifies as a receiver of the message and Canvas authentication succeeds. Here, the message is processed by the current node. 6.2.3 Interaction with Routing Protocols The purpose of a routing protocol is to forward a message between hosts (nodes in the context of sensor networks) so it eventually arrives at its destination. Two major issues in routing are addressing the destination of a message, and path setup. Conventional routing protocols are often not suitable for sensor networks since they fail to appropriately consider the limited resources of sensor nodes, the prevalent communication patterns, and the inherent redundancy in sensor networks. Here, we consider routing mechanisms that are well-suited for sensor networks, and examine how interleaved authentication interacts with them. Flooding The simplest mode of propagating a message through a network is flooding. While it guarantees that every relevant node receives the message, many redundant messages are transmitted. Due to its inefficiency, its applicability is rather limited. However, it deserves consideration as in some cases it is the only reliable way of distributing a message. In a simple flooding protocol, each forwarding node transmits a message to all of its neighbours (except the one from which the message has been received). A node needs only to be aware of its immediate neighbours. Using the Canvas scheme for message authentication, a forwarding node has to transmit not only the message itself but also authentication codes for all the nodes on the next k levels of its forwarding tree. Although it is possible to send all these codes to all neighbours, it is very inefficient, since the nodes on deeper levels will not be able to make use of most of the authentication codes they receive. In order to reduce the overhead, it is reasonable for a forwarding node to impose some structure, a “forwarding tree”, on its k-neighbourhood, and use this structure to transmit only selected authentication codes to its neighbours.
6.2. Basic Interleaved Authentication 169 This forwarding tree is constructed as follows. The source node starts by designating each of its neighbours as the root of a forwarding subtree of depth k. In Fig. 6.3(a), an example for k = 2 is shown. The source transmits authentication codes to these roots for all the nodes that are contained in their respective subtrees. Each root then proceeds by adding another level to its own subtree. The nodes on the next k − 1 levels of the tree are already fixed, so a root has to determine only the nodes that have to be included in the tree on the last level. It includes the nodes that fulfill the following two requirements: 1. They are located in a distance of k hops from the current root. 2. They are reachable from any node on the last level in the current forwarding tree. Each of the thereby selected nodes is then assigned as a child to one of the (k − 1)-level nodes of the current forwarding tree. Figure 6.3(b) shows the example situation after the first expansion step. (a) (b) Figure 6.3: The first two stages when flooding a message with Canvas (k = 2). The message source is shown as a big black dot. (a) In the first step, its immediate neighbours receive the message with authentication codes for the neighbour itself and the next level of nodes. (b) In the second step, the message is transferred to the next level and authentication codes for the second-next level are created. Thick black lines indicate the links over which the message is being sent. Thick grey lines represent the following tree level determined by the message authentication codes This procedure guarantess that all nodes that are reachable from the source will eventually receive the message. The reason is that every node that is reachable from the source is included in at least one forwarding subtree, and all nodes
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Diss. ETH Nr. 18174 Protocols for S
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ii often ad hoc and transient natur
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iv Dieses Ziel kann durch kryptogra
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Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Backg
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Contents ix 3.3.1 Basic Assumptions
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Contents xi 6.3 Performance Evaluat
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Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Backgrou
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1.3. Contributions 3 on the other h
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1.4. Thesis Outline 5 • Mario Str
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Chapter 2 Wireless Sensor Networks
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2.1. Applications of Wireless Senso
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2.1. Applications of Wireless Senso
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2.2. Sensor Node Characteristics 13
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2.3. Related Network Types 21 zero,
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2.3. Related Network Types 23 • P
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2.3. Related Network Types 25 PAN,
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2.4. Related Device Types 27 in con
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2.4. Related Device Types 29 ports
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2.5. Sensor Network Models 31 both
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2.5. Sensor Network Models 33 are a
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2.6. Simulation of Sensor Networks
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2.7. Security Requirements 41 terac
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2.7. Security Requirements 43 netwo
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2.7. Security Requirements 45 acces
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2.7. Security Requirements 47 2.7.6
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2.7. Security Requirements 49 of te
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2.8. Cryptography for Sensor Networ
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2.9. Existing Approaches to Wireles
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Chapter 3 A Security Model for Wire
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3.1. Attack Paths 67 field (cf. [17
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3.1. Attack Paths 69 modules [63].
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3.1. Attack Paths 71 closed environ
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3.2. Attack Objectives 73 • Timel
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3.2. Attack Objectives 75 Critical
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3.2. Attack Objectives 77 Actors A
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 79 a
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 81 c
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 83 p
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3.4. The Cost of End-to-End Securit
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3.4. The Cost of End-to-End Securit
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3.5. Approximating End-to-End Secur
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3.7. Summary 95 Location-constraine
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Chapter 4 Key Establishment Shared
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4.2. Random Key Pre-Distribution 99
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4.3. Key Agreement Based on Hash Ch
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Page 131 and 132: 4.4. Multiple Hash Chains for Key A
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Page 141 and 142: 4.7. Summary 127 The security of th
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Page 205 and 206: 6.4. Security Evaluation 191 of the
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Page 223 and 224: 6.7. Applications 209 Psi 1 0.8 0.6
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7.1. Secure Communication in Wirele
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7.2. Future Work 221 7.1.4 Shortcut
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Bibliography [1] Specification of t
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Bibliography 225 1st European Works
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Bibliography 227 [41] Rohan Chitrad
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Bibliography 229 [64] L. Eschenauer
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Bibliography 231 [85] Yahoo! Inc. D
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Bibliography 233 [105] Kristof Van
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Bibliography 235 [126] Anne Marie M
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Bibliography 237 [150] Sylvia Ratna
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Bibliography 239 [172] Thanos Stath
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Bibliography 241 [192] Eric W. Weis
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Curriculum Vitae Harald Vogt Person
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