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Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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6.3. Per<strong>for</strong>mance Evaluation 177<br />

We compare the 2-Canvas scheme with elliptic curve signatures. The comparison<br />

is illustrated along three measures: the overall s<strong>in</strong>gle-message bandwidth<br />

overhead, i.e. the sum of the authentication data transmitted by all nodes;<br />

the time overhead <strong>for</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>gle message; and the bandwidth overhead if multiple<br />

messages are be<strong>in</strong>g exchanged.<br />

The parameters are fixed as follows: the message sizes used are 64 byte and<br />

512 byte, which makes a difference <strong>for</strong> the Canvas scheme as the message must<br />

be hashed by each node. For the Canvas authentication codes we use either all<br />

20 bytes that are output by the SHA-1 algorithm, or the truncated version with<br />

7 bytes, which correspondes to the security level of DES. The key length <strong>for</strong> EC<br />

signatures is assumed to be 192 bits, which provides a lower security level than<br />

the 160 bits of the SHA-1 output. The times required <strong>for</strong> per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g operations<br />

are taken from Tables 3.1 and 2.2 whereby the time <strong>for</strong> EC signature generation<br />

is estimated to be 600 ms.<br />

Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the time overhead <strong>in</strong>duced by each of the authentication<br />

schemes. The delay of the signature scheme is constant as only the<br />

source and the target nodes have to per<strong>for</strong>m additional operations. With the<br />

Canvas scheme, each <strong>in</strong>termediate node has to per<strong>for</strong>m operations that pile up<br />

over the path. At some path length, the overhead produced by Canvas will be<br />

larger than that of a signature scheme. The graphs show clearly the disadvantage<br />

of HMAC, which requires the message to be hashed <strong>for</strong> each MAC. The<br />

time overhead <strong>in</strong>creases the end-to-end latency of the message, <strong>in</strong> addition of<br />

the transmission time.<br />

Figure 6.9 illustrates the bandwidth overhead of the authentication schemes.<br />

In each hop, authentication <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation must be transmitted that adds to the<br />

overall amount of transmitted data. It shows the clear advantage of the Canvas<br />

scheme, which produces less data overhead than a signature scheme. Especially<br />

when the output of the MAC generat<strong>in</strong>g function is truncated, only a<br />

small overhead is produced. This option is not available <strong>for</strong> signature schemes,<br />

where the signature always has to be transmitted <strong>in</strong> full length. However, MAC<br />

truncation means that the security level is effectively reduced.<br />

6.3.2 Multiple Messages Overhead<br />

When us<strong>in</strong>g a signature scheme, the certificate data only has to be exchanged<br />

once between a pair of nodes. This allows to amortize this additional overhead<br />

if multiple messages are be<strong>in</strong>g exchanged. This is illustrated <strong>in</strong> Figure 6.10. In<br />

this example, if more than seven messages are exchanged, the signature scheme<br />

is advantageous over Canvas when MACs are transmitted <strong>in</strong> full length. If

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