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Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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4.5. Strengthen<strong>in</strong>g Random Key Pre-Distribution 121<br />

from the hash cha<strong>in</strong>s, are distributed to the nodes. After determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the common<br />

set of hash cha<strong>in</strong>s, these are used to agree on a l<strong>in</strong>k key between two nodes<br />

as described above. By comb<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g both key agreement schemes <strong>in</strong> this way, we<br />

reta<strong>in</strong> the advantages of both. This results <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>creased resilience compared<br />

to either one of the schemes.<br />

4.5.1 A Comb<strong>in</strong>ed Approach<br />

We generalize the key selection function F to <strong>in</strong>clude the additional step of<br />

trans<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g an element of the key pool <strong>in</strong>to a hash cha<strong>in</strong> value. First, we fix<br />

two seeds g1 and g2 that def<strong>in</strong>e two different contexts <strong>for</strong> the pseudo random<br />

sequence generator Ψ and the pseudo random number generator Φ. We will<br />

also need to choose the maximum length of key cha<strong>in</strong>s, T , and a hash function<br />

h <strong>for</strong> generat<strong>in</strong>g hash cha<strong>in</strong>s. Next, we <strong>in</strong>troduce two new functions F1 and F2<br />

that represent the different phases of the new scheme:<br />

• F1(IDu) = Ψ g1(IDu,1,S,m) = 〈v1,...,vm〉<br />

• F2(IDu,s,i) = h ai(s) <strong>for</strong> Φ g2(IDu,0,T − 1,m) = 〈a1,...,am〉<br />

This leads to our new def<strong>in</strong>ition of the key selection function F:<br />

F(IDu) = 〈F2(IDu,K [F1(IDu)[1]],1),...,F2(IDu,K [F1(IDu)[m]],m)〉<br />

Operationally, this means that, <strong>for</strong> each node u, the KDC first selects m keys<br />

from the key pool uni<strong>for</strong>mly at random, us<strong>in</strong>g the (pseudo-) random sequence<br />

generator Ψ g1. On each of these root keys, it then applies the hash function h<br />

repeatedly, where the number of repetitions is determ<strong>in</strong>ed by Φ g2, to obta<strong>in</strong> the<br />

f<strong>in</strong>al keys that go <strong>in</strong>to the node’s key r<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

The key establishment between two nodes now proceeds <strong>in</strong> two steps. First,<br />

the common set of <strong>in</strong>dices <strong>in</strong>to K is determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the same manner as previously<br />

described. Then ϕ = Φ g2 is used to determ<strong>in</strong>e the hash cha<strong>in</strong> positions of<br />

the other node and the l<strong>in</strong>k key is established as described <strong>in</strong> section 4.4.<br />

We will now show that although key establishment based on hash cha<strong>in</strong>s<br />

alone yields only small resilience, the resilience of a random key predistribution<br />

scheme is significantly improved through this comb<strong>in</strong>ed approach. We assume<br />

that hash cha<strong>in</strong>s are of sufficient length such that equation (4.7) provides a valid<br />

approximation to hash cha<strong>in</strong> key resilience.<br />

4.5.2 Resilience<br />

The strength of the adversay is now not only determ<strong>in</strong>ed by the number of<br />

dist<strong>in</strong>ct root keys he obta<strong>in</strong>s, but also on their hash cha<strong>in</strong> positions. The more

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