Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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30 Chapter 2. Wireless Sensor Networks and Their Security It is expected that with the emergence of ubiquitous computing, embedded systems will become more widespread as the costs for hardware are decreasing and integration becomes easier with novel materials. In order to make full use of such a large number of embedded computers, they will be able to connect to each other and their environment. It can be expected that through the increased utility they provide, these systems will then also be used in security-relevant applications. Thereby, these devices will carry sensitive information and thus must be protected against abuse. At least, user interactions with them are likely to be recorded and can be tracked, which may violate a user’s privacy. The main difference between embedded computers and sensor networks is that the integration of a sensor node to its environment is usually not very tight, while an embedded computer implements a significant part of the functionality of the object in which it is embedded. An embedded system does not have to operate autonomously but may make use of the resources provided by the containing object. For example, the above mentioned on-board-units act on behalf of trucks in the context of road pricing, and are also powered by these trucks. In contrast, a sensor node should function independently from its environment, since its main task is to monitor the environment without being intrusive. However, the borders between these two concepts are becoming blurry in applications such as “smart tagging” (cf. [167]) where sensor nodes are being attached to physical items. The task of a node here is to monitor the context of a specific item, thus both entities are becoming closely coupled. As the underlying technologies are similar in both cases, sensor networks eventually have to be considered as a special case of networked embedded systems. Maintaining the security of an embedded system is a challenging task since such systems incorporate features from two worlds, namely those of powerful computers being responsible for critical functionalities, and those of autonomously operating devices with limited application scope. The first characteristic requires the application of security mechanisms that are also being applied in desktop or server-oriented computing, which are resource-intensive in terms of computing power as well as development and maintenance effort. On the other hand, the second characteristic requires freedom of administrative overhead and cost minimization. Achieving these opposing goals is obviously not trivial. Additional security requirements of embedded systems are discussed in [97], which include their energy constraints and the context of developing embedded systems. Digital Rights Management is also an issue for embedded systems handling protected content [135]. The application space of sensor networks is very constrained, so many security issues for general embedded systems are mostly irrelevant. However, in
2.5. Sensor Network Models 31 both cases devices are potentially exposed to attackers. Tamper resistance (or tamper evidence, if sufficient) is therefore a major requirement for their security [95, 151]. The research focus in sensor networks, including security mechanisms, is mainly governed by the assumption that resources are very tightly contrained and replenishing the energy source is often not possible. In contrast, embedded computers are usually adapted to and integrated with their application environment, which is often of a technical nature where a power source is available and where regular maintenance is performed. Therefore, existing security mechanisms can often be adapted to the special requirements of embedded systems, while novel mechanisms are needed for sensor networks. 2.5 Sensor Network Models 2.5.1 The Geometric Model of Sensor Networks It is common in the literature to represent the topology of a sensor network as a graph in the plane, where vertices represent sensor nodes, each at its distinct location, and an edge exists between two vertices if the respective nodes can communicate over a (wireless) link. For simplicity, it is often assumed that these links are symmetric, and that the communication range is equal for all nodes. Usually, the deployment model for sensor networks is assumed to be random, i.e. nodes are randomly distributed on a plane within a constrained area, e.g. a square or a circle. Most often, a uniform random distribution is assumed. This distribution makes the least assumptions about the real-world deployment and thus one can hope that this model provides useful information about a large class of real-world networks. Although these assumptions are stretching the practical properties of sensor networks, they provide a useful abstraction for performing calculations and simulations on such networks. For this random geometric graph model, there exists a large body of theoretical work, which is comprehensively presented by Penrose [140]. One of the most important aspects is the connectivity of such graphs. In a wireless network, it is desirable that all nodes are contained in one large connected component of the network graph. This means that there exists a path between every pair of these nodes. Isolated nodes, or small connected components, are undesirable since these nodes are not able to collaborate with other nodes, and it may not be possible for them to communicate with a base station. Bettstetter [18] evaluates the conditions under which a wireless network is connected with high probability. In particular, the required transmission range is derived for a given density (number of nodes per area unit), and, vice versa, if a transmission range
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Page 4 and 5: ii often ad hoc and transient natur
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Page 9 and 10: Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Backg
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Page 63 and 64: 2.7. Security Requirements 49 of te
Page 65 and 66: 2.8. Cryptography for Sensor Networ
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Page 81 and 82: 3.1. Attack Paths 67 field (cf. [17
Page 83 and 84: 3.1. Attack Paths 69 modules [63].
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Page 87 and 88: 3.2. Attack Objectives 73 • Timel
Page 89 and 90: 3.2. Attack Objectives 75 Critical
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 81 c
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 83 p
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3.4. The Cost of End-to-End Securit
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3.4. The Cost of End-to-End Securit
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3.5. Approximating End-to-End Secur
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3.7. Summary 95 Location-constraine
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Chapter 4 Key Establishment Shared
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4.2. Random Key Pre-Distribution 99
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4.3. Key Agreement Based on Hash Ch
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4.4. Multiple Hash Chains for Key A
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4.4. Multiple Hash Chains for Key A
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4.5. Strengthening Random Key Pre-D
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4.6. Related Work 123 pc = 0.33 Du-
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4.6. Related Work 125 Probability o
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4.7. Summary 127 The security of th
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Chapter 5 Multipath Communication T
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5.1. Principles of Multipath Commun
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5.2. Routing on Spanning Trees 133
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5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 141 b
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5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 143 a
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5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 145 n
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5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 147 F
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5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 149 D
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5.4. Security Evaluation 151 compro
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5.5. Related Work 153 width usage a
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5.5. Related Work 155 separation. F
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Chapter 6 Integrity-Preserving Comm
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6.1. Authentication and Integrity P
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6.2. Basic Interleaved Authenticati
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6.3. Performance Evaluation 175 A B
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6.3. Performance Evaluation 177 We
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6.4. Security Evaluation 179 Bandwi
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6.4. Security Evaluation 181 a sens
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6.4. Security Evaluation 183 Number
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6.4. Security Evaluation 185 We ass
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6.4. Security Evaluation 187 Paths
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6.4. Security Evaluation 189 ity of
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6.4. Security Evaluation 191 of the
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6.4. Security Evaluation 193 The se
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6.5. Extended Interleaved Authentic
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6.6. Comparing Interleaved and Mult
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6.7. Applications 209 Psi 1 0.8 0.6
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6.7. Applications 211 codes are att
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6.7. Applications 213 domain. The r
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6.9. Summary 215 simulations and by
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Chapter 7 Conclusion This work prop
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7.1. Secure Communication in Wirele
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7.2. Future Work 221 7.1.4 Shortcut
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Bibliography [1] Specification of t
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Bibliography 225 1st European Works
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Bibliography 227 [41] Rohan Chitrad
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Bibliography 229 [64] L. Eschenauer
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Bibliography 231 [85] Yahoo! Inc. D
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Bibliography 233 [105] Kristof Van
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Bibliography 235 [126] Anne Marie M
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Bibliography 237 [150] Sylvia Ratna
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Bibliography 239 [172] Thanos Stath
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Bibliography 241 [192] Eric W. Weis
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Curriculum Vitae Harald Vogt Person
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