Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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152 Chapter 5. Multipath Communication Psi 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 Random spread; hop-to-hop authentication Random spread Hitpoints Concentrated Partition 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 Compromised nodes Figure 5.14: Resilience of the tree-based multipath scheme under various attacks of attacks where compromised nodes are clustered. In both cases, the hitpoint and the concentrated attacks, the scheme has significant advantages. 5.5 Related Work The transmission of data over multiple paths has been widely studied and is extensively used in modern communication networks. Most practically used schemes, however, do not use the paths to transmit data redundantly but to increase the availability or the bandwidth of a connection. The basis for the security of a multipath scheme is threshold security. 5.5.1 Multiple Paths for Performance Multipath routing is a commonly used technique on the Internet, where the OSPF (Open Shortest Path First) protocol [128] is widely supported. It supports the maintenance of routing information about multiple paths that all have equal cost. A router computes the shortest paths to all target nodes and keeps a list of possible next hops for each target. One of them is selected for each new transmission. Thereby, multiple paths are used between two end-points sequentially. For mobile ad hoc networks, node-disjoint multipath routing has been widely studied. The main focus has been on improving the performance, i.e. band-
5.5. Related Work 153 width usage and latency, and the reliability of message transmissions over multiple hops. Establishing fixed routes between end-points is impossible in such networks due to the mobility of the intermediate nodes or the end-points themselves. Node-disjointness is desirable in order to minimize the dependency of paths on specific nodes. There are many variants how multiple node-disjoint paths can be established, but most of them fall into two categories, either ondemand or proactive protocols. In the on-demand approach, a sender that wants to transmit a message first sends out a message requesting path establishment. This message will be forwarded to the destination over multiple paths by intermediary nodes. The path information is recorded in these messages and can be used by the destination to select the best paths (for example, the most disjoint with the lowest delay). The information about the selected paths is then transferred back to the sender. An example of such a protocol is split multipath routing [111]. The proactive approach demands that nodes continuously maintain routing information. One example is “meshed multipath routing” [48]. A centralized communication architecture is assumed, with many source nodes and a single data sink, where nodes relay messages always towards this sink. For this purpose, they classify their neighbours into two categories: nodes that are farther away from the sink and nodes that are closer to it. Messages are generally forwarded to all neighbours that are closer to the sink. Alternatively, only one neighbour is selected to which the message is forwarded. Note that in this approach, node-disjoint paths are not explicitly created but if they exist, they are implicitly used. The multipath routing schemes described by Ganesan et al. [68] are intended to provide alternate paths in the event that a node on the primary path fails. The primary path is usually the shortest path, or the path that provides the lowest latency. There are two kinds of alternate paths, either completely or partially node-disjoint to the primary path (the latter are called braided baths, since they try to circumvent single nodes on the primary path). The method of construction prefers alternate paths that are geographically close to the primary path, for both types of alternate paths. The construction of alternate paths depends on local interactions only, nodes need no global knowledge about the topology of the network. The goal is to be as energy-efficient as possible. By construction, this approach does not lead to spatial separation but instead prefers paths that are in close proximity. Spanning trees have been proposed by Chen et al. [40] for routing in mobile ad hoc networks. In that work, the focus has been put on maintaining a single spanning tree while nodes are mobile. Nodes are identified by their IP addresses
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Diss. ETH Nr. 18174 Protocols for S
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ii often ad hoc and transient natur
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iv Dieses Ziel kann durch kryptogra
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Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Backg
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Contents ix 3.3.1 Basic Assumptions
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Contents xi 6.3 Performance Evaluat
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Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Backgrou
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1.3. Contributions 3 on the other h
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1.4. Thesis Outline 5 • Mario Str
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Chapter 2 Wireless Sensor Networks
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2.1. Applications of Wireless Senso
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2.1. Applications of Wireless Senso
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2.2. Sensor Node Characteristics 13
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2.3. Related Network Types 21 zero,
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2.3. Related Network Types 23 • P
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2.3. Related Network Types 25 PAN,
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2.4. Related Device Types 27 in con
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2.4. Related Device Types 29 ports
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2.5. Sensor Network Models 31 both
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2.5. Sensor Network Models 33 are a
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2.6. Simulation of Sensor Networks
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2.7. Security Requirements 41 terac
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2.7. Security Requirements 43 netwo
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2.7. Security Requirements 45 acces
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2.7. Security Requirements 47 2.7.6
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2.7. Security Requirements 49 of te
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2.8. Cryptography for Sensor Networ
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2.9. Existing Approaches to Wireles
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Chapter 3 A Security Model for Wire
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3.1. Attack Paths 67 field (cf. [17
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3.1. Attack Paths 69 modules [63].
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3.1. Attack Paths 71 closed environ
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3.2. Attack Objectives 73 • Timel
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3.2. Attack Objectives 75 Critical
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3.2. Attack Objectives 77 Actors A
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 79 a
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 81 c
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 83 p
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3.4. The Cost of End-to-End Securit
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3.4. The Cost of End-to-End Securit
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3.5. Approximating End-to-End Secur
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3.7. Summary 95 Location-constraine
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Chapter 4 Key Establishment Shared
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4.2. Random Key Pre-Distribution 99
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Page 125 and 126: 4.3. Key Agreement Based on Hash Ch
Page 131 and 132: 4.4. Multiple Hash Chains for Key A
Page 133 and 134: 4.4. Multiple Hash Chains for Key A
Page 135 and 136: 4.5. Strengthening Random Key Pre-D
Page 137 and 138: 4.6. Related Work 123 pc = 0.33 Du-
Page 139 and 140: 4.6. Related Work 125 Probability o
Page 141 and 142: 4.7. Summary 127 The security of th
Page 143 and 144: Chapter 5 Multipath Communication T
Page 145 and 146: 5.1. Principles of Multipath Commun
Page 147 and 148: 5.2. Routing on Spanning Trees 133
Page 155 and 156: 5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 141 b
Page 157 and 158: 5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 143 a
Page 159 and 160: 5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 145 n
Page 161 and 162: 5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 147 F
Page 163 and 164: 5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 149 D
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Page 169 and 170: 5.5. Related Work 155 separation. F
Page 171 and 172: Chapter 6 Integrity-Preserving Comm
Page 173 and 174: 6.1. Authentication and Integrity P
Page 175 and 176: 6.2. Basic Interleaved Authenticati
Page 189 and 190: 6.3. Performance Evaluation 175 A B
Page 191 and 192: 6.3. Performance Evaluation 177 We
Page 193 and 194: 6.4. Security Evaluation 179 Bandwi
Page 195 and 196: 6.4. Security Evaluation 181 a sens
Page 197 and 198: 6.4. Security Evaluation 183 Number
Page 199 and 200: 6.4. Security Evaluation 185 We ass
Page 201 and 202: 6.4. Security Evaluation 187 Paths
Page 203 and 204: 6.4. Security Evaluation 189 ity of
Page 205 and 206: 6.4. Security Evaluation 191 of the
Page 207 and 208: 6.4. Security Evaluation 193 The se
Page 209 and 210: 6.5. Extended Interleaved Authentic
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6.5. Extended Interleaved Authentic
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6.5. Extended Interleaved Authentic
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6.6. Comparing Interleaved and Mult
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6.7. Applications 209 Psi 1 0.8 0.6
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6.7. Applications 211 codes are att
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6.7. Applications 213 domain. The r
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6.9. Summary 215 simulations and by
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Chapter 7 Conclusion This work prop
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7.1. Secure Communication in Wirele
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7.2. Future Work 221 7.1.4 Shortcut
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Bibliography [1] Specification of t
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Bibliography 225 1st European Works
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Bibliography 227 [41] Rohan Chitrad
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Bibliography 229 [64] L. Eschenauer
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Bibliography 231 [85] Yahoo! Inc. D
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Bibliography 233 [105] Kristof Van
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Bibliography 235 [126] Anne Marie M
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Bibliography 237 [150] Sylvia Ratna
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Bibliography 239 [172] Thanos Stath
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Bibliography 241 [192] Eric W. Weis
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Curriculum Vitae Harald Vogt Person
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