Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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150 Chapter 5. Multipath Communication There are several other ways to increase the delivery rate. One method is to switch the routing mode as soon as the message arrives at a node of the routing tree where neither the node’s cover area nor any of its children contains the message’s target location. Now, the subtree is chosen whose cover area is closest to the target location, and the message is routed to this subtree. This continues until the message arrives at a leaf node, from which point on the message is routed, for example, using a geographical routing scheme. This procedure only kicks in when routing has gone wrong. The overhead of this method would be slightly more complex code in the nodes to implement the search for the closest cover area and geographical routing scheme over short distances. No additional messages are sent, but the delivery rate is increased to 100%. Another method to increase the delivery rate is to pass a message always to all subtrees that presumably cover the target location. That way, the message will eventually reach a node that covers the target location. However, the message will also travel many more hops than are necessary, increasing the message overhead significantly at much simpler node logic. 5.4 Security Evaluation 5.4.1 Basic Security Model The security of a multi-path communication scheme is, first of all, provided by the fact that the attacker has to compromise multiple intermediate nodes in order to break a single communication relationship. If k (k ≥ 2) paths are used for transmitting a message, or authentication codes, compromising a number of paths smaller than k will at least lead to detection of the attack. Thus, if at least one path remains sound, the integrity of messages is ensured. We assume that the individual paths of a multi-path scheme use only link authentication. This means that a single compromised node on such a path will compromise the complete path. It is, of course, possible to employ more advanced authentication schemes on individual paths. This possibility will be explored in the next chapter. For the basic determination of the security of tree paths we consider a random spread attack. Using a link authentication scheme, a single compromised node will break an individual path. Let x be the number of compromised nodes in the network, and N be the total number of nodes. For a tree path, this leads to the following compromise probability: pc = 1 − (1 − x N )Lm. Using k paths in a multi-path scheme, the integrity of a message is compromised if all paths are
5.4. Security Evaluation 151 compromised, i.e. with probability p k c. Under a concentrated attack, we intuitively expect an advantage from the spatial separation of tree paths. This is in contrast to a random attack, where spatial separation provides no such advantage. But when a certain confined area is under attack, compromising all paths that lead through that area, we can hope to circumvent the area with at least one of multiple paths. We would therefore expect that a concentrated attack is not as effective as a random attack against the multiple tree path scheme. The improvement spatial separation can provide has its limitations, however. First of all, the approach does not scale well beyond two paths. A third path will likely have intersections with the other paths, and it will be on the same side of the line given by the communication endpoints as another path. Thus, with more than two paths, there is no real spatial separation anymore. The second limitation is that spatial separation works well only if the geometrical arrangement of paths and attack area is favourable. In many cases, spatial separation does not help. If the attack area is close to one of the communication endpoints, the spatial separation between paths is low, and it is not unlikely that both paths go through the attack area. If the attack area grows, it also becomes more likely that it covers both paths. If both endpoints are close to each other, multiple paths are mostly useless. If the endpoints happen to be both outside of the attack area, it is likely that the nodes between them are also uncompromised. In that case tree paths or, for that matter, any multiple path scheme, can provide no additional security. On the other hand, if one of the endpoints is compromised, no security scheme can help. 5.4.2 Resilience Against Attacks Figure 5.14 shows simulation results for the tree-based multipath scheme under various attacks. It is easy to see that, as discussed in the previous section, the multipath scheme provides to advantage to hop-to-hop authentication under a random spread attack. This type of attack does not geographically cluster the compromised nodes, thus the spatial separation of the multipath scheme is of no use. The scheme is also not helpful against a partitioning attack. If both endpoints are located on different sides of the attack line, all paths between them are affected by the attack, so using multiple of them does not provide an advantage. The simulation verifies, however, that the scheme is helpful against the types
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Diss. ETH Nr. 18174 Protocols for S
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ii often ad hoc and transient natur
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iv Dieses Ziel kann durch kryptogra
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Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Backg
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Contents ix 3.3.1 Basic Assumptions
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Contents xi 6.3 Performance Evaluat
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Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Backgrou
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1.3. Contributions 3 on the other h
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1.4. Thesis Outline 5 • Mario Str
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Chapter 2 Wireless Sensor Networks
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2.1. Applications of Wireless Senso
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2.1. Applications of Wireless Senso
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2.2. Sensor Node Characteristics 13
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2.3. Related Network Types 21 zero,
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2.3. Related Network Types 23 • P
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2.3. Related Network Types 25 PAN,
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2.4. Related Device Types 27 in con
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2.4. Related Device Types 29 ports
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2.5. Sensor Network Models 31 both
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2.5. Sensor Network Models 33 are a
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2.6. Simulation of Sensor Networks
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2.7. Security Requirements 41 terac
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2.7. Security Requirements 43 netwo
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2.7. Security Requirements 45 acces
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2.7. Security Requirements 47 2.7.6
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2.7. Security Requirements 49 of te
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2.8. Cryptography for Sensor Networ
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2.9. Existing Approaches to Wireles
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Chapter 3 A Security Model for Wire
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3.1. Attack Paths 67 field (cf. [17
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3.1. Attack Paths 69 modules [63].
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3.1. Attack Paths 71 closed environ
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3.2. Attack Objectives 73 • Timel
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3.2. Attack Objectives 75 Critical
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3.2. Attack Objectives 77 Actors A
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 79 a
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 81 c
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 83 p
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3.4. The Cost of End-to-End Securit
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3.4. The Cost of End-to-End Securit
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3.5. Approximating End-to-End Secur
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3.7. Summary 95 Location-constraine
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Chapter 4 Key Establishment Shared
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6.5. Extended Interleaved Authentic
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6.6. Comparing Interleaved and Mult
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6.7. Applications 209 Psi 1 0.8 0.6
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6.7. Applications 211 codes are att
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6.7. Applications 213 domain. The r
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6.9. Summary 215 simulations and by
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Chapter 7 Conclusion This work prop
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7.1. Secure Communication in Wirele
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7.2. Future Work 221 7.1.4 Shortcut
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Bibliography [1] Specification of t
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Bibliography 225 1st European Works
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Bibliography 227 [41] Rohan Chitrad
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Bibliography 229 [64] L. Eschenauer
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Bibliography 231 [85] Yahoo! Inc. D
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Bibliography 233 [105] Kristof Van
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Bibliography 235 [126] Anne Marie M
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Bibliography 237 [150] Sylvia Ratna
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Bibliography 239 [172] Thanos Stath
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Bibliography 241 [192] Eric W. Weis
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Curriculum Vitae Harald Vogt Person
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