journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

98
Vladislav Zubok
primary goal of the Gorbachev reformers in the late 1980s, they failed to realize
this incompatibility themselves, which contributed to their false optimism at the
start of perestroika and to the willingness to accept geostrategic defeat in Central
Europe.
The European geopolitical revolution of 1989-90 was the logical conclusion of
the process started by the Marshall Plan in 1947. Yet, Gorbachev’s reaction to it
was diametrically opposite to the reaction of Joseph Stalin. While the first Soviet
General Secretary harshly rejected the perspective of a united Europe, seeing it
more as a threat than a potential opportunity for economic and political partnership,
the last General Secretary sacrificed immediate security assets in the name of a
long-term prospect of his country’s partnership with a new united Europe. Many of
Gorbachev’s countrymen have had second thoughts today as to whether or not that
choice was a prudent one. Some politicians feel humiliated by Russia’s marginalization
in European affairs and by NATO’s overeagerness to oblige Eastern European
countries (and possibly Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) in their desire
to obtain security guarantees against an unpredictable big neighbor to the East. It
will take some time for the dust to settle and for the Russians to realize their new
position vis-à-vis Europe in the light of contemporary history. This history clearly
shows that the decision of Stalin’s leadership to oppose the forces of European integration
was a tragic and costly mistake that the Russians cannot afford to repeat.
Vladislav Zubok