journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

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Ronald W. Pruessen
tination or delay.” 54 Dulles, for his part, quickly began to apply pressure on London
and Paris. During Washington meetings with the British and French foreign ministers
in July 1953, he could hardly have been more emphatic regarding the need to
rapidly ratify EDC:
“The history of the past two hundred years (...) showed that Western Europe would
tear itself to pieces unless the Franco-German problem were resolved. He said the
results of the European wars had been a decline in the power and influence of Western
civilization. At present it almost looked as if this were our last chance which
would be followed by a return to the Dark Ages if we failed. The Secretary concluded,
saying it was impossible to exaggerate the importance which we attach to
European integration, and the tragic effects which would result if it appeared the
movement were dead.” 55
The most famous example of Dulles’s pressure for EDC, of course, was his
“agonizing reappraisal” speech of December 14, 1953. What is often lacking in
commentary on the notorious phrasing of this statement, however, is awareness of
the way in which the broader case being made was a vintage example of “triple
containment” logic. EDC’s value, Dulles told the North Atlantic Council, was its
potential for ending the “traditional strife” that had plagued Europe. Why might the
United States have to undertake “an agonizing reappraisal” of its transatlantic relations?
“The answer is that the nations which have long led the West have so repeatedly
fought each other that they have sapped their own vitality and diminished their
authority and their prestige in the world. If the West cannot now build a safer home
for its civilization, then its statesmanship will be judged bankrupt and men everywhere
will look elsewhere for leadership (...) If (...) the European Defense Community
should not become effective, if France and Germany remain apart so that they
will again be potential enemies then there would indeed be grave doubt as to whether
Continental Europe could be made a place of safety.”
It should also be added that Dulles explicitly distinguished between his Cold War
concerns and the other forces pushing him toward such faith in EDC’s value. “Even if
the Soviet threat were totally to disappear,” he revealingly argued, “would we be
blind to the danger that the West may destroy itself? Surely there is an urgent, positive
duty on all of us to seek to end that danger which comes from within.” 56
Conclusion
The passing of time and the expansion of historical research makes it desirable to
complexify the old and seemingly familiar story of US enthusiasm for EDC – to
broaden analysis from narrow emphasis on Cold War anxieties to more widerang-
54. FRUS, 1952-1954, V, 649-650.
55. FRUS, 1952-1954, V, 1623.
56. FRUS, 1952-1954, V, 461-468.