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The Role of the Soviet-Union as a Factor in the French Debates 79
threat and by advocating both “discrete conversations” and an “active diplomacy”.
38
In July 1953, the Washington conference of the three major Western powers
then debated the advisability of proposing to the USSR a Big Four conference on
Germany. The British stated that they would not accept negotiations with the USSR
unless the EDC was ratified by France. Finally yielding to Bidault’s pleadings they
then revised their position and on July 15; the Western powers extended an invitation
to the USSR. Bidault made sure that this invitation did not contain passages
which could serve as an excuse for Soviets to decline. 39
In the Quai d’Orsay, officials were quite sceptical. It seemed to them that the
suppression of the uprisings in the GDR showed that the USSR did not really
intend to go ahead with free elections for a unified Germany, even in exchange for
the scuttling of the EDC. At the conference they anticipated Bidault would demand
free elections, the USSR would refuse and the division of Germany would continue
– a situation which was well in line with France’s interests. 40
And yet, in its notes of August 4 and 15, 1953, the USSR accepted a Big Four
conference, to discuss a provisional German government, free elections, and the
working out of a peace treaty. In his speech before the Supreme Soviet of August 8,
Malenkov emphasized the necessity of bringing the Cold War to an end. Addressing
France, he called it France’s major interest to give up the EDC. To Bidault it
appeared indispensable to stick to the proposal of a Big Four conference in order
“to corner the USSR” 41 (“au pied du mur”). Similarly, Auriol used his leverage in
favour of holding a conference. The Gaullists, through their spokesman Gaston
Palewski, encouraged him. For, since the death of Stalin, Palewski argued, it had
become possible to negotiate with the Russians, whereas the United States made no
acceptable proposals to them. 42
President Auriol meanwhile prevailed on Ambassador Joxe to continue his
démarches with Molotov, in order to find a solution to the German problem, in
spite of the annoyance of the Quai d’Orsay which considered that this initiative
might create divisions among the Western allies. According to Auriol, Joxe could
propose to the Russians a European army including German units part of which
would be stationed along the frontier of the Rhine, while the other part would be
stationed along the neutralized Oder- Neiße border. In the heart of Germany there
would be a total demilitarization. In his attempts to approach the Russians, Joxe
would have to tell them: “Germany should not be a weapon in the hands of the one
or the other.” 43
38. E. WEISENFELD, Quelle Allemagne pour la France? La politique française et l’unité allemande
depuis 1944, translated from German, Paris 1989, p. 66.
39. Council of Ministers, 22 July 1953; AURIOL, op.cit., 1953-1954, p. 290-291.
40. Notes of August 1953, quoted by SOUTOU, “La France et les notes soviétiques”, op.cit., p. 271.
41. Council of Ministers, 29 September 1953; AURIOL, op.cit., 1953-1954, p. 437.
42. Conversation by Auriol with Palewski, 6 October 1953; ibidem, p. 448.
43. Note of 16 October 1953 on a talk Auriol-Joxe; ibidem, p. 467-468.