journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

38
Klaus Larres
Peace” speech with which Eisenhower and his close adviser C.D. Jackson intended
to counter the increasingly successful peace campaign waged by the Kremlin. Even
anti-Communist hawk Foreign Secretary John Foster Dulles advised Eisenhower
against the dangerous consequences of exploiting the fluid situation in Moscow,
warning that the new leaders might overreact. 118
On May 11, 1953 Churchill took the initiative. In a speech in the House of
Commons, he revived his plan to arrange for a World War II-style summit between
the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain. 119 Churchill wished to enter negotiations
to solve all outstanding East-West problems at a meeting unfettered by a
formal agenda. In several secret conversations and memoranda Churchill subsequently
expressed the notion that a reunited and neutral Germany and the sacrifice
of the Federal Republic’s rearmament and integration with the West might prove a
suitable price for a global détente. At one point he told his advisers confidentially
“that he had not closed his mind to the possibility of a unified and neutralized Germany
(...) as part of a settlement with the Russians”. 120 Churchill envisaged the
signing of a security pact between the Soviet Union and a reunited Germany, rather
like the Locarno pact of 1925, which would be guaranteed by Great Britain. 121
The dominant factor in Churchill’s consideration was the realization that only a
global détente would allow Britain to catch up with the two superpowers in the economic
and military field, maintain its Empire and Commonwealth and remain one of
the great powers of the world. Churchill was aware that, if no détente with the Soviet
Union was achieved and the armaments race and Cold War competition between the
two blocs continued, Britain would lose out, and be forever dependent on the generosity
of the United States. If détente could be realized, his country would be able to
reduce its world-wide military commitments and concentrate on its economic and
technological development, including the manufacturing of a British H-bomb and the
necessary methods of delivery. A West German newspaper commented that after Britain
had lost a quarter of her wealth in the war, Churchill’s “purpose now was to
secure a long period of peace and recovery” for his country. 122
However, Churchill’s notion that London could bring about a global détente
with Britain as the guarantor of peace and security between the Soviet Union and a
united but neutral Germany, much exaggerated Britain’s importance and its military
capabilities in the post-war world. The Prime Minister’s own Foreign Office,
118. See K. LARRES, “Eisenhower and the First Forty Days after Stalin’s Death: The Incompatibility
of Détente and Political Warfare”, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol.6 (1995), pp.431-69.
119. See note 117.
120. PRO: FO 371/103 660/C 1016/32 (19/5/53), minute Dixon to Strang and Roberts about his conversation
with Churchill on 16 May 1953.
121. PRO: FO 371/103 660/C 1016/32, minute Dixon to Strang and Roberts, 19 May 1953, about his conversation
with Churchill on 16 May 1953; ibid., minute Strang to Dixon, 19 May 1953, about his conversations
with Churchill on 18.5.1953; ibid., PREM 11/449 (also in FO 800/794), Churchill to
Strang, M 178/53, 31.5.1953. See also H.C. Deb., 5th series, Vol.515, 11 May 1953, cols.896-97.
122. PRO: FO 371/103 704/C 1073/4, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 14 May 1953; also C
1073/3, FAZ, 12 May 1953; D. C. WATT, “Churchill und der Kalte Krieg”, Schweizer Monatshefte,
Sonderbeilage, Vol. 61 (1981), p.18.