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The Soviets and European Integration from Stalin to Gorbatchev 95
in the name of stability and unity. Later the Soviet leader found much in common
with other schools of European unity, particularly “social Christianity” and the
Roman Church. “Paradoxically,” Gorbachev’s adviser mused later, “the search for a
new relationship with the West, the process of disarmament, designed as a means
‘to ensure external conditions’ for perestroika, began to turn into its engine (...)”. In
order to achieve success in the new foreign policy, one had to crack down on the
myths and dogmas of confrontational ideology and ‘theory.’” 22 However, the lack
of a profound economic strategy in Gorbachev’s policies, the persistent illusions
about the “socialist economy” in the USSR, led to the failure of the Soviet leader,
even in 1989-1990, to realize that the whole Soviet regime and economy, as it
existed, had no chance of becoming part of the “Common European Home”.
Defining the role of the West at the end of the Cold War, former US ambassador
in Moscow Jack Matlock points at two factors – the firmness and strength of the
Western policies (on the scenario “written in Washington”) and the example of
Western prosperity and freedom. 23 I would emphasize the emergence of a new,
non-threatening and prosperous Western Europe, as a crucial external factor that
influenced Gorbachev’s statesmanship, as its domestic reforms and foreign policy
entered the period of revolutionary changes in 1989-1990. Deepening integrative
processes in Western Europe, with the increasingly active involvement of smaller
and neutral states, as well as the traditional “outsider,” Great Britain, became for
Gorbachev and his advisers a crucial factor in their decision not to resist the collapse
of communist regimes in Eastern Europe – the event that changed overnight
the continent’s geopolitics and left the USSR without European allies. Gorbachev
and his advisers (and a considerable segment of Soviet public opinion) reacted to
the breakdown of the Soviet security system with moderation and tolerance, and
eventually accepted this as a movement towards a united Europe, where the USSR
would eventually gain a proper place. In the end, the new perception of Western
Europe as a non-threatening, peace oriented community, allowed Gorbachev to outgrow
his memories of World War II and discard the traditional germanophobia in
favor of a flexible and pragmatic diplomacy.
The most serious test of the “new thinking” was the German reunification process
after the collapse of the Berlin wall. Historic memories and psychological factors
could have easily turned the USSR into a “spoiler” of this process, especially
since the established German experts in the government were the ones who were
the most suspicious and alarmist with regard to Germany and the Germans. 24 These
experts, under the weight of their professional expertise and responsibility, tended
to defend the geopolitical status quo, and mistrust the “fairy bird” of the USSR’s
embrace with Western Europe. After all, West Germany’s integration into NATO,
they argued, happened on the anti-Soviet platform, and nobody could guarantee
22. Chernyaev, op.cit., p.191.
23. J. MATLOCK, Autopsy on an Empire. The American Ambassador’s account of the collapse of the
Soviet Union, New York 1995, pp.669-671.
24. MATLOCK, op.cit., p.387 (on the possibility to “spoil” the process); Shakhnazarov, op.cit., p.120
(on the German experts).