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The Role of the Soviet-Union as a Factor in the French Debates 77
At the cabinet meetings of 19 and 23 March 1952, Robert Schuman argued thus:
One should not be negative, but one should confront the Soviet note with a “constructive
policy”, one should ask questions about free elections and the prerequisites for
the establishment of a government for a unified Germany, in order to “see clearly”
and to get to know the Soviets’ real intentions. Vincent Auriol raised the stakes:
France could not tolerate dilatory formulas; instead what was needed was a precise
plan that would prevent German-Russian rapprochement on the one hand, as well as
any chance for Germany to reconquer its eastern territories on the other. 27
On March 28, 1952, in a conversation with Pleven, now minister of defence, the
President acknowledged that no time should be lost in organizing the European
army, in order to put an end to the efforts by Germany to blackmail the West; but
one should do so without forgetting that the French would have to come to an
agreement with the Russians, unless one wanted the Germans to do this first. In his
opinion the Quai d’Orsay lacked subtlety and finesse, because after all there was a
real chance to come to an understanding with the Russians. 28
Auriol returned to that question after the receipt of the second Russian note of
April 9, 1952: In order to avoid the danger that Germany will either arrive at an
understanding with the USSR or drag the Western powers into a war against the
East, it will be necessary to offer to Moscow the abandonment of the EDC, free
elections under Four Power control, the neutralization and the demilitarization of
Germany with only a few international contingents stationed along the Western and
Eastern borders under UN control. 29 What was important was not to lose contact
with the Russians and not to seek to “cut corners”. 30
Following the third Soviet note of May 25, which was more polemical than the
earlier two and which rejected the Western proposals, Auriol urged U.S. Secretary of
State Dean Acheson not to harden the American position; the allied reply should not
be purely negative, because, “the Russians fear Germany as much as we do”; for that
reason, it was wise not to close the door to any conversation; one could construct the
EDC in a way that one would arrive at “a sort of internationalization of security in
Germany”. Schuman made the same point vis-à-vis Dean Acheson as well. 31
Nonetheless, the French government did sign the EDC treaty on May 27, 1952.
But it did not begin ratification procedures, because it knew perfectly well that it
could not muster a majority in Parliament for it. German rearmament now appeared
all the more inopportune, as discussions were being held in the UN disarmament
commission. Jules Moch, who represented France, told his Soviet opposite number,
Malik, that signing a treaty did not automatically mean ratifying it: The future of
the EDC treaty depended on the future of East-West relations; in any case, he
assured him that ratification would not occur that year, if at all. 32
27. Council of Ministers, 19 et 23 March 1952; AURIOL, op.cit., 1952, p. 211-212, 278.
28. Ibidem, p. 245-246.
29. Letter by Auriol to Pleven 11 April 1952; ibidem, p. 270-271.
30. Letter by Auriol to Schuman 6 May 1952; ibidem, p. 306-308.
31. Conversation of Auriol with Dean Acheson 28 May 1952, and Council of Ministers, 29 May 1952;
ibidem, p. 366 et 369.