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42
Klaus Larres
plate” as the American people were always ready to turn towards “complete isolationism”.
139
During the second half of June 1953 Churchill arrived at the conclusion that
either the EDC or some other solution to German rearmament and western integration
had to be realized before the West would permit him to convene a summit conference
with the Soviet Union. Even if such an event would then not be able to
bring about German unification, Churchill believed that a summit meeting could
contribute to instigating a global détente. It would therefore still be a worthwhile
enterprise to pursue. As the Prime Minister had never been in favour of the EDC
and did not believe that the French parliament would ever ratify the treaty, he
pushed increasingly hard to obtain West German membership of NATO as soon as
possible. For example in a memorandum dated July 9, 1953, Churchill suggested
that it might be a good idea to confront the French with an ultimatum. Britain and
the United States should ask the French parliament to ratify the EDC by the end of
October 1953. 140 If they did not do so, a new NATO treaty would have to be concluded
possibly without French participation. This strategy was soon referred to as
the policy of the “empty chair”. According to Churchill this new NATO pact would
have the advantage of not giving any of the member states a veto about the inclusion
of the Federal Republic. 141 The Prime Minister had of course in mind that
once West Germany had become a member he would be able to immediately continue
with his summit diplomacy. On July 6, 1953 he stated:
“With either EDC or a reformed NATO (with or without France’s formal adhesion)
we should be in a far better position to talk to Russia than if the present indefinite
delay continued. (...) Let us therefore, as our first aim, persuade the French to ratify
EDC in October. This could and should be coupled with a declaration of willingness
for a four-Power Conference before the end of the year.” 142
Although eventually the NATO alternative to the EDC was realized in 1954/55,
this came much too late to be of any help to Churchill’s summit policy. The opposition
to his plans from Washington, Bonn and from within his own Foreign Office
had not abated. Moreover, the elderly Prime Minister had already suffered a severe
stroke in June 1953. 143 In collusion, Adenauer and Dulles used this opportunity to
undermine Churchill’s policy. At a western Foreign Ministers’ Conference in
Washington in July 1953, Dulles, with the help of Blankenhorn, and a letter submitted
by the Chancellor, persuaded his British and French colleagues to invite the
Soviet Union to a conference. It seemed necessary to show German public opinion
that the West was prepared to discuss the German question with the USSR. 144 Ade-
139. BOYLE (ed.), Correspondence, p.85: Eisenhower to Churchill, 6 July 1953. Dulles had a similar opinion.
See for example, PRO: PREM 11/373 (WU 1197/489 G), 10 July 1953. See also D. FELKEN, Dulles und
Deutschland. Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1953-59, Bonn 1993, pp.222 ff., esp.230-35.
140. PRO: CAB 129/61, C.(53)194, memorandum Churchill to Salisbury and Strang, 6 July 1953. See
also MORAN, Churchill, p.425: diary entry, 6 July 1953.
141. See DOCKRILL, Britain’s Policy, pp.131, 140, 149.
142. PRO: CAB 129/61, C.(53)194, memorandum Churchill to Salisbury und Strang, 6 July 1953.
143. See COLVILLE, Fringes of Power, pp.668-70; MORAN, Churchill, pp.408-74; M. GILBERT,
Winston S. Churchill, Vol.8: Never Despair, 1945-1965, London 1988 pp.846-92.