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44
Klaus Larres
the course of the conference in early December, and much to Eden’s and the British
Foreign Office’s relief, Eisenhower remained steadfast. The President preferred
the foreign ministers’ conference as arranged by Dulles and Adenauer in
the course of the Washington meeting in July. A deeply disappointed and embittered
Churchill returned to London. He had also finally realized that the American
decision to let the projected conference with Moscow end in failure could not
be prevented. 151
Indeed, apart from an agreement to convene a conference on Indochina and
Korea in the summer, the Berlin Conference of January and February 1954
achieved no tangible results. Both sides seemed to be content with the European
status quo. 152 Western politicians now intensified their efforts to get the EDC
treaty ratified by the French Parliament which despite American pressure still
showed no inclination of voting on the Treaty. 153 In the following months, particularly
in Britain but also in the United States and in the Federal Republic, alternative
schemes were once again secretly worked out in case the EDC should
fail. 154
151. See FRUS, 1952-54, Vol.5, pp.1737-1837; PRO: FO 371/125 138/ZP 23/2/G, bound volume
with the British minutes of the bi- and trilateral meetings and conversations (Documents 1 to 13).
(See particularly the reports of the first day of the conference, Dec. 4; see also MORAN, Churchill,
pp.505-06, 508: diary entries, 5.12.1953 and 7.12.1953); SHUCKBURGH, Descent to Suez,
pp.112-17: diary entries, early Dec.1953; COLVILLE, Fringes of Power, pp.681-90: diary entries,
early Dec.1953; J.W. YOUNG, “Churchill, the Russians and the Western Alliance: the
three-power conference at Bermuda, December 1953”, English Historical Review, vol.101
(1986), pp.902-12.
152. On the Berlin Conference see PRO: FO 371/109 269-302; ibid., PREM 11/664, 665; FO 800/761;
FRUS, 1952-54, Vol.7, pp.601 ff., 871-77, 1177-80; A. EDEN, Full Circle: Memoirs, London
1960, pp.53-76; Adenauer, Erinnerungen, pp.245-59; H.-J. RUPIEPER, “Die Berliner Außenministerkonferenz
von 1954. Ein Höhepunkt der Ost-West-Propaganda oder die letzte Möglichkeit
zur Schaffung der deutschen Einheit?”, in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, vol. 34 (1986),
pp.427-53; R. STEININGER, “Deutsche Frage und Berliner Konferenz 1954”, in: W. VENOHR
(ed.), Ein Deutschland wird es sein, Erlangen 1990, pp.39-88.; N. KATZER, “Eine Übung im
Kalten Krieg”. Die Berliner Außenministerkonferenz von 1954, Cologne 1995.
153. According to Eden this was now “the most urgent question”. PRO: CAB 128/27, Part I,
C.C.(54)10th conclusions, minute 1, 22 Feb. 1954. See in detail DOCKRILL, Britain’s Policy,
pp.134-38; also K. MAIER, “Die Auseinandersetzungen um die EVG als europäisches Unterbündnis
der NATO 1950-54. Die EVG als supranationales Instrument für die kontrollierte Bewaffnung
der Bundesrepublik”, in: L. HERBST et al. (eds.), Vom Marshall Plan zur EWG. Die Eingliederung
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt, Munich 1990, p.455. See also B.R.
DUCHIN, “The Agonizing Reappraisal – Eisenhower, Dulles, and the European Defence Community”,
in: Diplomatic History, vol.16 (1992), pp.201-21.
154. See for example PRO: PREM 11/667, Makins, Washington, to FO, No.1258, 24 June 1954.