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Integrating Europe or Ending the Cold War? 15
Integrating Europe or Ending the Cold War?
Churchill’s post-war foreign policy
Klaus Larres
“We see nothing but good and hope in a richer, freer, more contented European communality.
But we have our own dream and our own task. We are with Europe, but not
of it. We are linked but not compromised. We are interested and associated but not
absorbed” (Winston S. Churchill, February 1930). 1
This view of Great Britain’s relationship with continental Europe well summarizes
Winston Churchill’s attitude towards European integration throughout his
political career. Various speeches and comments as leader of His Majesty’s opposition
in the years after 1945 confirmed this view. However, in a climate of increasingly
widespread enthusiasm for European unity as the main instrument to overcome
the continent’s numerous post-war problems, Churchill carefully
differentiated between a policy of ever-increasing unity, which was right for the
continental countries, and a very different policy of full independence for Britain.
The latter was almost entirely ignored by continental politicians. Instead, his early
post-war speeches in Zurich, The Hague, Strasbourg and elsewhere were enthusiastically
greeted and widely misunderstood. It was, therefore, almost inevitable that
soon after the formation of Churchill’s peacetime government in October 1951,
some of the so-called pro-European members of his government as well as a considerable
number of continental political leaders became deeply disappointed by
his new administration’s European policy. 2 Contrary to all expectations, Churchill’s
post-war administration did not embark upon a more flexible and open-minded policy
towards the European continent. In fact, it was extremely difficult to discern
any difference between the European policies of Clement Attlee’s Labour party and
the new Conservative government. 3 This led the former French Prime Minister,
Paul Reynaud, to express the view in March 1952 that “the trouble is (...) that in
England the statesmen are pro-European when they belong to the Opposition, and
anti-European when they are in power”. 4
1. Quoted in C. PONTING, Churchill, London 1994, p.737; see also Churchill’s speech at a meeting of
the European Movement in London, 28 Nov. 1949, in R. S. CHURCHILL (ed.), In the Balance:
Speeches 1949 and 1950, London 1951, p.152.
2. See J. W. YOUNG, “Churchill’s ‘No’ to Europe: The ‘Rejection’ of European Union by Churchill’s
Post-war Government, 1951-52”, Historical Journal, vol. 28, 1985, pp.923-37.
3. See ibid., pp.923-27; G. WARNER, “The Labour Governments and the Unity of Western Europe,
1945-51”, in Ritchie OVENDALE (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments,
1945-51, Leicester 1984, pp.67-68; A. NUTTING, Europe Will Not Wait: a Warning and a Way Out,
London 1960; A. MONTAGUE BROWNE, Long Sunset: Memoirs of Winston Churchill’s Last Private
Secretary, London 1995, pp.270-76. See also the various articles in G. SCHMIDT (ed.),
Grossbritannien und Europa – Grossbritannien in Europa, Bochum 1989.
4. Quoted in H. J. HEISER, British Policy with regard to the unification efforts on the European continent,
Leyden 1959, p.84.
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