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Ronald W. Pruessen
harder and harder to develop the vast potential that did exist? Throughout 1950, for
example, there was a great deal of US hand-wringing over the “neutralist” temptations
of European allies. On July 14, Acheson told the Cabinet that “It is becoming
apparent to the world that we do not have the capabilities to face the threat, and the
feeling in Europe is changing from one of elation that the United States has come
into the Korean crisis to petrified fright.” From London, a dismayed Ambassador
Lewis Douglas observed that “the will to fight (...) lies largely dormant” on the
continent – “not because the great majority of the French people and of the German
people and of the Belgians and the Dutch prefer communism, but because they
doubt that the Soviet hordes can be resisted.” 15
Early and mid-1950 anxieties led to specific policy conclusions – which in turn
eventually led to EDC. Whatever the costs, Washington concluded, NSC-68’s blueprint
for a dramatic buildup of “Free World” strength had to be vivified. Mobilization
on a variety of fronts was to be rapidly undertaken, with a willingness to
tolerate risks and waste: as Acheson put it, “Prompt action is worth more than perfect
action.” 16
A layer upon layer effort was envisioned. First, significant expansion of the
US’s own forces would be necessary. Truman would go to Congress in order to –
again in Acheson’s words – “ask for money, and if it is a question of asking for too
little or too much, he should ask for too much.” 17
Second, European allies should be pressed toward maximum military preparedness
as well. Aside from the fact that this would valuably augment overall anticommunist
strength, it would also nudge Congress toward greater generosity by
demonstrating the stalwart support lining up behind new US leadership.
Third, however, Washington would also take steps to make it easier for the
Europeans to be more forthcoming in the first place. Aside from continuing or
expanding the material aid already arranged under the Military Assistance Program,
the Truman administration opened itself to reconsideration of a longterm
placement of US divisions in Europe and to the appointment of an American
supreme commander for NATO. As Ambassador Lewis Douglas phrased it, such
steps would “spur (...) the will to fight” among continental allies – there would be a
“heavier weight upon America for the defense of Europe” and it would become
clear that the US was willing to “wear the toga” of both immediate and ultimate
responsibility. 18
Fourth, yet another step would be required in order to make it easier for both
Americans and European allies to take the preceding ones: some means of tapping
West Germany’s potential military strength would be devised. Given the massive
costs of massive rearmament, Germany seemed as necessary for movement as it
had when continental economic recovery had been the objective. In spite of many
qualms about giving any kind of military capacities to a hated enemy only five
15. FRUS, 1950, I, 345; FRUS, 1950, III, 191.
16. FRUS, 1950, I, 345.
17. FRUS, 1950, I, 344-345.
18. FRUS, 1950, III, 190-191.