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Klaus Larres
ing “to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire”. 37 In this respect, even
the Anglo-American “special relationship” had to take a backseat. Undoubtedly
Churchill possessed “a pugnacious determination to maintain the greatness of the
British Empire”. 38 While he did not intend to claim any territorial or other advantages
from the war, he made it clear that he would do everything in his power to
prevent his country from being “deprived of anything which rightly belongs to her
after having given her best services to the good cause”. 39
Moreover, Churchill had become much more concerned towards the close of the
war with practical policy concerning Germany and the prevention of yet another
situation which would entail the roots of a major war, than with working out general
plans for the future of Europe. Like a number of other political personalities in
France, Germany and the United States, Churchill had realized that the future peace
of Europe depended above all on a rapprochement between France and Germany.
Already in 1923, in the first volume of his The World Crisis, he had wondered
whether prior to 1914 the British “by some effort, some compulsive gesture, at
once of friendship and command [could] have reconciled France and Germany in
time and forced that grand association on which alone the peace and glory of
Europe would be safe?” 40 In general Churchill was quite well-disposed towards the
German nation. He admired its cultural achievements, economic success and military
leaders like Hindenburg and Ludendorff. In May 1912, in the midst of the
naval race between the British and German empires, he wrote to a friend: “I have
never had any but friendly feelings towards that great nation (...) and I regard the
antagonism which has developed as insensate. Anything in my power to terminate
it, I would gladly do (...)”. 41 Even during the Second World War, as early as
December 1940, he voiced his opinion that one had to differentiate between the
Nazi regime and the German people. He very much hoped that the victorious powers
would succeed in ensuring that “Germany was going to remain in the European
family (...) there should be no Pariahs”. 42 This conviction would continue into the
post-war period. Churchill reminded people of Edmund Burke’s statement that one
should not “frame an indictment against an entire people” and proclaimed that
37. Speech at the Lord Mayor’s banquet on 10 Nov. 1942. Quoted in William Roger LOUIS, Imperialism
at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-45 (New York,
1978), p.200. See also R. v. ALBERTINI, “Die USA und die Kolonialfrage (1917-45)”, Vierteljahreshefte
für Zeitgeschichte, vol.13 (1965), pp.1-31.
38. A.J.P. TAYLOR, “The Statesman”, in: idem., Churchill: Four Faces and the Man, London 1969,
p.18; also HILLGRUBER, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, pp.156-57; and Churchill’s various statements on
“Britain and the Empire”, in C. R. COOTE (ed.), Sir Winston Churchill: A Self-Portrait, London
1954, pp.212-35.
39. Letter from Churchill to Roosevelt, 4 March 1944. Quoted in KIMBALL (ed.), Churchill & Roosevelt,
vol.3, p.17.
40. The World Crisis, Vol.I: 1911-1914, London 1923, p.14.
41. Quoted in R. HOUGH, Former Naval Person: Churchill and the Wars at Sea, London 1985, p.51;
see also TAYLOR, “The Statesman”, pp.15-16; and above all D. G. BOADLE, Winston Churchill
and the German Question in British Foreign Policy, 1918-1922, The Hague 1973, pp.10 ff.
42. Quoted in COLVILLE, Fringes of Power, pp.312-13: diary entry, 13 Dec. 1940; see also A. MON-
TAGUE BROWNE, Long Sunset, p.159.