journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

78
Pierre Guillen
The change of government of January 1953 did not mean a change of attitude.
George Bidault, who replaced Schuman in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had not
committed himself to the EDC. His view was that one could find a modus vivendi
with the USSR which would have to be based not on a unified and neutralized Germany,
which would be as dangerous to the East as it would be to the West, but on
upholding the division of Germany in a way that the two camps would integrate
their respective Germany, while ensuring that this integration would not do damage
to the other camp. 33
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After the death of Stalin in March 1953, the French government wondered whether
Soviet foreign policy would not change direction. In a speech delivered before the
British House of Commons on May 11, 1953, Churchill relaunched his project for
a Big Four conference on Germany. One month later, the disturbances in East Germany
revived speculations about a possible German unification. What were the
consequences that one could draw from these events as far as the EDC was concerned?
Bidault received conflicting advice and concluded that it was “urgently
necessary to wait”. 34 As for President Vincent Auriol, he instructed the French
ambassador in Moscow, Louis Joxe, to tell Molotov that he would try to “arrange
all these matters”; he planned to go to Russia in order to try to bring their views on
European security and the German problem more closely together. 35
The signing of the armistice in Korea in July 1953 further reinforced the argument
of the opponents of the EDC: As a détente was taking shape, it seemed hardly
advisable to rearm Germany and thus to impair the relations with the USSR. In
other words: ratifying the EDC treaty was held to compromise any chances for disarmament
and the maintenance of peace. 36
Joseph Laniel, the new Prime Minister after the June 1953 reshuffle, and
Bidault, who kept the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, were both subject to American
pressures to ratify the treaty and tried to put the Americans off. It was impossible,
they explained, to submit the treaty to Parliament before convening a conference of
the Big Four, a step which in principle had been decided on. The number of those
members of parliament who defended this point of view was also increasing. The
determined opposition from the extremes of right and left in parliament and the
divisions within the governmental majority therefore continued to block the process
of ratification. 37 In November, at a press conference, de Gaulle also gave his
blessing to EDC’s opponents by depicting Russia as an ally if there was a German
32. Conversation of Auriol with Jules Moch, 9 July 1952; ibidem, p. 481.
33. SOUTOU, “La France et les notes soviétiques”, op.cit., who uses the archives of the Quai d’Orsay
and the Bidault papers, deposited at the Archives nationales.
34. BARIETY, op.cit.
35. Conversation by Auriol with Joxe, 28 May 1953; AURIOL, op.cit., 1953-1954, p. 209-210.
36. POIDEVIN, op.cit.
37. SOUTOU, “France and the German Rearmament”, op.cit., p. 506-507.