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Klaus Larres
no possibility of entering into negotiations with the Kremlin. Such talks required a
more pleasant atmosphere and above all “adequate preparations”. 60 Even Anthony
Eden was highly sceptical of Churchill’s ideas. Eden and US Secretary of State
Acheson agreed that, at some time in the future, negotiations with the Soviet Union
would be necessary. However, contrary to Churchill’s opinion, they did not believe
that time was working against the West – quite the contrary. 61 However, to Churchill
his twin-track strategy of western unity and rearmament and the more or less
simultaneous pursuit of genuine negotiations was still the only feasible policy
which would prevent another world war.
Churchill’s repeated calls for European unity, and even for the creation of a
United States of Europe between 1945 and 1951 as leader of the opposition, must
be seen as part of his strategy to impress upon Stalin the coherence, strength and
resolution of the western world led by the Anglo-American “fraternal association”.
62 Other factors like a Franco-German rapprochement, German re-integration
into the civilized world, the development of economic stability in Europe, and a
certain willingness to bow to American pressure in the European question were
also important considerations which led to his calls for a united Europe. 63 However,
Churchill’s grand design for the post-war world consisted of arriving at an
amicable settlement with the Soviet Union by means of “negotiations from
strength”. His calls for European unity were part and parcel of that scenario; they
ought not to be regarded as separate from that design. It is clear that European integration
for its own sake was not one of his prime objectives. His “ultimate aim”
was the end of the Cold War and with it “the unity and freedom of the whole of
Europe”. 64
The issues which appeared to be most pressing to him (good relations with
Moscow; Anglo-American relations; European unity without full British participation),
all made an appearance in one of his most famous speeches ever – his address
at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946. The Fulton speech in
fact outlined Churchill’s grand strategy for the post-war world by calling for both
an international settlement and a policy of strength while emphasizing the enduring
importance of the British Empire and Commonwealth.
This speech attracted particular attention because of its at first sight violent anti-
Russian tone, which elevated Churchill almost overnight to the Cold Warrior par
excellence. Churchill used the address to warn the world with his forceful rhetoric
of Stalin’s aggressive intentions and the ever encroaching expansionist ambitions
60. “Foreign Affairs” speech, H.C. Deb., 5th series, Vol.473, 28 March 1950, col.209.
61. See EDEN, “Foreign Affairs” speech, ibid., 28 March 1950, col.317-18; BELL, Negotiation, p.24.
62. See LARRES, Politik der Illusionen, pp.40-62; also Churchill’s speech at the Albert Hall, London,
14 May 1947, when he attended a “United Europe Meeting”, in R. S. CHURCHILL (ed.), Europe
Unite, pp.83-85: “The whole purpose of a united democratic Europe is to give decisive guarantees
against aggression” (p.83).
63. See for example Churchill’s speech to the Congress of Europe in The Hague, 7 May 1948, in R. S.
CHURCHILL (ed.), ibid., pp.310-17.
64. Churchill, speech to the Council of the European Movement, Brussels, 26 Feb. 1949, in R. S.
CHURCHILL (ed.), In the Balance, p.29.