journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
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journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
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Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 117<br />
Charles Maier, Lawrence Kaplan, and Marinella Neri Gual<strong>de</strong>si on the economic, military<br />
and political aspects <strong>of</strong> American influence in Europe.<br />
Perhaps the most eloquent tribute to American cultural influence lies in the <strong>de</strong>cision to<br />
publish the proceedings in English, although it would have been easier to do so in Italian.<br />
The manner in which the sometime major cultural languages <strong>of</strong> Continental Europe are<br />
being gradually marginalised in international discourse is itself likely to remain one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
more enduring consequences <strong>of</strong> the Cold War era.<br />
J.J.LEE,<br />
University College Cork<br />
Elisabeth POND. – Beyond the Wall. Germany’s Road to Unification. A Twentieth Century<br />
Fund Book. Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1993, XV-367 p. ISBN 0-8157-7154-1.<br />
28,95 US$.<br />
This is the first scientific research <strong>of</strong> events and <strong>de</strong>velopments resulting in the German unification<br />
in 1990. Based on pr<strong>of</strong>ound historical research and striving for extensive perspectives<br />
it <strong>of</strong>fers a wealth <strong>of</strong> information about the second German unification process, the outline <strong>of</strong><br />
which will be lasting in the long run. As a long-standing American correspon<strong>de</strong>nt in West<br />
Germany, familiar with the <strong>de</strong>velopment <strong>of</strong> East-West-relations, Elisabeth Pond did not only<br />
critically analyse the varied source material <strong>of</strong> the actors <strong>of</strong> German unification, but she also<br />
had more than 100 conversations with well-known politicians, senior <strong>of</strong>ficials and leading<br />
experts. In this way she could partly compensate the <strong>de</strong>ficiency <strong>of</strong> internal sources. At the<br />
same time she recor<strong>de</strong>d several impressions and facts, which probably have not been documented<br />
in writing.<br />
From Pond’s point <strong>of</strong> view, the <strong>de</strong>monstrations in Dres<strong>de</strong>n, Leipzig and Berlin at the<br />
beginning <strong>of</strong> October 1989 finally ma<strong>de</strong> the breakthrough <strong>of</strong> the revolution: the <strong>de</strong>monstrators<br />
became more and more self-confi<strong>de</strong>nt and conscious <strong>of</strong> their new power; the SED-lea<strong>de</strong>rs<br />
on the other hand did not have the courage <strong>of</strong> using force, as they realized that the Soviet<br />
Union would not support them any longer. Gorbachevs Perestroika and the critical acceleration<br />
<strong>of</strong> reforms in Hungary and Poland confused them completely. Pond <strong>de</strong>scribes the total<br />
vacuum <strong>of</strong> lea<strong>de</strong>rship in East-Berlin, resulting from this confusion and explains (with it) the<br />
paralyzing <strong>of</strong> the whole system <strong>of</strong> repression as well as the enormous power <strong>of</strong> the popular<br />
movement. From the 9th <strong>of</strong> October the movement could push through what it wanted: at<br />
first the overthrow <strong>of</strong> the SED-regime and then the membership <strong>of</strong> the Fe<strong>de</strong>ral Republic.<br />
According to Pond’s analysis, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich<br />
Genscher as well as Presi<strong>de</strong>nt Bush and his administration took over the function <strong>of</strong><br />
channeling the movement. Kohl was first <strong>of</strong> all interested in maintaining his position as a<br />
leading politician <strong>of</strong> the Fe<strong>de</strong>ral Republic and in preventing unconsi<strong>de</strong>red actions which<br />
might jeopardize the process <strong>of</strong> a peaceful change. He accelerated the process <strong>of</strong> change<br />
actively un<strong>de</strong>r the pressure <strong>of</strong> the East German migrants and the growing expectation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
GDR-population, who no longer trusted their own politicians. After his visit in Moscow on<br />
February 11, 1990, which gave him the impression <strong>of</strong> a limited opportunity, the German<br />
unity became a short-term target.<br />
Bush’s part was less obvious, but nevertheless important. Pond is able to prove that Bush<br />
and Baker had <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d even in November 1989 to promote the German unification – in<br />
or<strong>de</strong>r to make sure that it would not result in an early dis<strong>integration</strong> <strong>of</strong> NATO. At his summit<br />
with Gorbachev in Malta on December 2 and 3 1989, Bush left the Soviet presi<strong>de</strong>nt in no<br />
doubt about his interest in German unification, but he assured him that he wanted to avoid<br />
isolation <strong>of</strong> the Soviet Union as the Germans unified. Both, pressure and promises finally