50 Klaus Larres
Cold War Threats 51 Cold War Threats and America’s Commitment to the European Defense Community: One Corner <strong>of</strong> a Triangle Ronald W. Pruessen “A twice-told tale” can be tedious, Shakespeare wrote in King John, ill-suited to rousing interest in “the dull ear <strong>of</strong> a drowsy man.” How much worse the likely fate <strong>of</strong> yet another recounting <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>t-told European Defense Community saga? After more than four <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s and countless discussions, is it time to pass by the EDC facts – or fiasco – in silence? No. Historians can be a strange breed, after all, possessed <strong>of</strong> an almost infinite capacity for review and retelling. This is usually to our credit. Our scholarly discipline appropriately assumes that the passage <strong>of</strong> time actually requires reconsi<strong>de</strong>ration <strong>of</strong> familiar tales: new sources may become available, later experiences may affect the way we read the old ones, cooling passions may alter judgments and conclusions, etc. The EDC “story,” in this respect, <strong>de</strong>serves regular revisiting – even if a drowsy rea<strong>de</strong>r may be somewhat at risk. Although specifically US policies regarding EDC have been consi<strong>de</strong>red many times, for example, our un<strong>de</strong>rstanding <strong>of</strong> those policies might well benefit from further attention. This is not to say a full-scale, blow-by-blow narrative covering all relevant <strong>de</strong>velopments between 1950 and 1954 will be necessary or appropriate here. The long and notorious course <strong>of</strong> Washington policy-making – from initial confusion and improvisation to ultimately ham-han<strong>de</strong>d threats <strong>of</strong> “agonizing reappraisal” – has been amply charted. 1 What might be valuable instead is an analytical updating regarding some <strong>of</strong> the themes or fundamentals which permeate the tale’s month-to-month unfolding. In particular, US perceptions and US motivations <strong>de</strong>serve ongoing consi<strong>de</strong>ration. What did American policy makers see in the world <strong>of</strong> the early 1950s which led them to support the creation <strong>of</strong> a supranational military organization by France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries? What goals did they think would be achieved by a multinational army with an integrated command operating in tan<strong>de</strong>m with a political superstructure that would serve as a <strong>de</strong> facto <strong>de</strong>fense ministry for a major portion <strong>of</strong> Europe? It is true that scholarly analysis along these lines has long 1. The standard source for the EDC story as a whole remains E. FURSDON, The European Defense Community: A History, London 1980. Because any number <strong>of</strong> important archival materials were unavailable to Fursdon at the time he was writing, more recent studies may be valuable even if their focus is somewhat different. S. DOCKRILL, Britain’s Policy For West German Rearmament, 1950- 1955, Cambridge 1991, provi<strong>de</strong>s numerous additional insights and much new evi<strong>de</strong>nce, for example. M. P. LEFFLER, A Prepon<strong>de</strong>rance <strong>of</strong> Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War, Stanford, California 1992, provi<strong>de</strong>s both a first-rate survey <strong>of</strong> foreign policy making throughout the 1945-1953 period and much information about the shaping <strong>of</strong> US policies regarding the strengthening <strong>of</strong> NATO and the rearmament <strong>of</strong> West Germany. D. ACHESON, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, New York 1969, also remains useful for its extensive attention to the American si<strong>de</strong> <strong>of</strong> the EDC story. Dieses Dokument wur<strong>de</strong> erstellt mit FrameMaker 4.0.4.