14 Introductory note – Introduction – Einführung
Integrating Europe or Ending the Cold War? 15 Integrating Europe or Ending the Cold War? Churchill’s post-war foreign policy Klaus Larres “We see nothing but good and hope in a richer, freer, more contented European communality. But we have our own dream and our own task. We are with Europe, but not <strong>of</strong> it. We are linked but not compromised. We are interested and associated but not absorbed” (Winston S. Churchill, February 1930). 1 This view <strong>of</strong> Great Britain’s relationship with continental Europe well summarizes Winston Churchill’s attitu<strong>de</strong> towards European <strong>integration</strong> throughout his political career. Various speeches and comments as lea<strong>de</strong>r <strong>of</strong> His Majesty’s opposition in the years after 1945 confirmed this view. However, in a climate <strong>of</strong> increasingly wi<strong>de</strong>spread enthusiasm for European unity as the main instrument to overcome the continent’s numerous post-war problems, Churchill carefully differentiated between a policy <strong>of</strong> ever-increasing unity, which was right for the continental countries, and a very different policy <strong>of</strong> full in<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce for Britain. The latter was almost entirely ignored by continental politicians. Instead, his early post-war speeches in Zurich, The Hague, Strasbourg and elsewhere were enthusiastically greeted and wi<strong>de</strong>ly misun<strong>de</strong>rstood. It was, therefore, almost inevitable that soon after the formation <strong>of</strong> Churchill’s peacetime government in October 1951, some <strong>of</strong> the so-called pro-European members <strong>of</strong> his government as well as a consi<strong>de</strong>rable number <strong>of</strong> continental political lea<strong>de</strong>rs became <strong>de</strong>eply disappointed by his new administration’s European policy. 2 Contrary to all expectations, Churchill’s post-war administration did not embark upon a more flexible and open-min<strong>de</strong>d policy towards the European continent. In fact, it was extremely difficult to discern any difference between the European policies <strong>of</strong> Clement Attlee’s Labour party and the new Conservative government. 3 This led the former French Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud, to express the view in March 1952 that “the trouble is (...) that in England the statesmen are pro-European when they belong to the Opposition, and anti-European when they are in power”. 4 1. Quoted in C. PONTING, Churchill, London 1994, p.737; see also Churchill’s speech at a meeting <strong>of</strong> the European Movement in London, 28 Nov. 1949, in R. S. CHURCHILL (ed.), In the Balance: Speeches 1949 and 1950, London 1951, p.152. 2. See J. W. YOUNG, “Churchill’s ‘No’ to Europe: The ‘Rejection’ <strong>of</strong> European Union by Churchill’s Post-war Government, 1951-52”, Historical Journal, vol. 28, 1985, pp.923-37. 3. See ibid., pp.923-27; G. WARNER, “The Labour Governments and the Unity <strong>of</strong> Western Europe, 1945-51”, in Ritchie OVENDALE (ed.), The Foreign Policy <strong>of</strong> the British Labour Governments, 1945-51, Leicester 1984, pp.67-68; A. NUTTING, Europe Will Not Wait: a Warning and a Way Out, London 1960; A. MONTAGUE BROWNE, Long Sunset: Memoirs <strong>of</strong> Winston Churchill’s Last Private Secretary, London 1995, pp.270-76. See also the various articles in G. SCHMIDT (ed.), Grossbritannien und Europa – Grossbritannien in Europa, Bochum 1989. 4. Quoted in H. J. HEISER, British Policy with regard to the unification efforts on the European continent, Ley<strong>de</strong>n 1959, p.84. Dieses Dokument wur<strong>de</strong> erstellt mit FrameMaker 4.0.4.