journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

34
Klaus Larres
Prime Minister again (1951–55)
Churchill received the opportunity to convince the world of his summit diplomacy
when the British people gave him a majority of 17 seats on 25 October 1951 to
form his last government. The new Prime Minister was already 77 years old and his
health had been in a precarious state for some years. His government was “too
much characterized by its chief’s stubborn battle for [political and physical] survival
to be a splendid affair”. 94 Churchill’s peacetime premiership largely was a
very consensual affair aiming at consolidation rather than radical change. Indeed,
he reversed only very few of the Labour government’s legislation (e.g. the nationalization
of iron and steel). 95
Churchill also continued Attlee’s policy towards European integration. Despite
occasional hints to the contrary while in opposition, he left the Labour government’s
decision not to participate in the Schuman Plan unaltered. By means of the Eden Plan
of 1952 his government merely attempted to re-design the High Authority of the
ECSC as well as the supranational EDC organs yet to be established into a non-supranational
body by proposing that both the ESCS and the EDC would be closely linked
to the Council of Europe. This was, however, eventually rejected by most European
states. 96 Churchill had taken no active interest in the ill-fated Eden Plan. His age no
longer allowed him to give equal consideration to all the many different areas of government.
With the exception of Egypt and the attempt to maintain Britain’s imperial
position in the Near East, Churchill concentrated entirely on his summit diplomacy
and related issues. He neglected almost all other external (and domestic) matters. 97
European issues would only attract his attention when they were directly connected
to his policy as a global peacemaker. In late November 1951, when referring to his
Zurich speech of 1946 in a cabinet paper entitled “United Europe”, Churchill made it
unambiguously clear that he had “never thought that Britain (...) should become an
integral part of a European Federation”. 98
His government’s attitude towards the European Defence Community, signed in
1952, was therefore never more than lukewarm though the EDC was the domineering
issue during his peace-time government as far as European integration was concerned.
The EDC was not only the instrument to achieve western European rearma-
94. R. JENKINS, “Churchill: The Government of 1951-1955”, in BLAKE and LOUIS (eds.), Churchill,
p.497; for an overview of this administration see A. SELDON, Churchill’s Indian Summer: The
Conservative Government, 1951-55, London 1981.
95. In a parliamentary speech in November 1951 Churchill explained the remedy for “deeply and painfully
divided” Britain: “What the nation needs is several years of quiet, steady administration, if only
to allow Socialist legislation to reach its full fruition. What the House needs is a period of tolerant
and constructive debating (...)”, H.C. Deb., 5th series, vol.493, 6 Nov. 1951, cols.68-69.
96. See YOUNG, “Churchill’s ‘No’”, pp.927, 932-36; NUTTING, Europe will not wait, pp.42-46; D.
SPIERENBURG and R. POIDEVIN, The History of the High Authority of the ECSC, London 1994,
pp.202-04.
97. See for example E. SHUCKBURGH, Descent to Suez, Diaries, 1951-56, London 1986, pp.24 ff.
98. PRO: CAB 129/48, C(51)32nd conclusions (29 Nov. 1951); see also A. MONTAGUE BROWNE,
Long Sunset, pp.271-72.