journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

Cold War Threats 51
Cold War Threats and America’s Commitment to the European
Defense Community: One Corner of a Triangle
Ronald W. Pruessen
“A twice-told tale” can be tedious, Shakespeare wrote in King John, ill-suited to
rousing interest in “the dull ear of a drowsy man.” How much worse the likely fate
of yet another recounting of the oft-told European Defense Community saga? After
more than four decades and countless discussions, is it time to pass by the EDC
facts – or fiasco – in silence?
No. Historians can be a strange breed, after all, possessed of an almost infinite
capacity for review and retelling. This is usually to our credit. Our scholarly discipline
appropriately assumes that the passage of time actually requires reconsideration
of familiar tales: new sources may become available, later experiences may
affect the way we read the old ones, cooling passions may alter judgments and conclusions,
etc. The EDC “story,” in this respect, deserves regular revisiting – even if
a drowsy reader may be somewhat at risk.
Although specifically US policies regarding EDC have been considered many
times, for example, our understanding of those policies might well benefit from
further attention. This is not to say a full-scale, blow-by-blow narrative covering all
relevant developments between 1950 and 1954 will be necessary or appropriate
here. The long and notorious course of Washington policy-making – from initial
confusion and improvisation to ultimately ham-handed threats of “agonizing reappraisal”
– has been amply charted. 1 What might be valuable instead is an analytical
updating regarding some of the themes or fundamentals which permeate the tale’s
month-to-month unfolding.
In particular, US perceptions and US motivations deserve ongoing consideration.
What did American policy makers see in the world of the early 1950s which
led them to support the creation of a supranational military organization by France,
Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries? What goals did they think would be
achieved by a multinational army with an integrated command operating in tandem
with a political superstructure that would serve as a de facto defense ministry for a
major portion of Europe? It is true that scholarly analysis along these lines has long
1. The standard source for the EDC story as a whole remains E. FURSDON, The European Defense
Community: A History, London 1980. Because any number of important archival materials were unavailable
to Fursdon at the time he was writing, more recent studies may be valuable even if their
focus is somewhat different. S. DOCKRILL, Britain’s Policy For West German Rearmament, 1950-
1955, Cambridge 1991, provides numerous additional insights and much new evidence, for example.
M. P. LEFFLER, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the
Cold War, Stanford, California 1992, provides both a first-rate survey of foreign policy making
throughout the 1945-1953 period and much information about the shaping of US policies regarding
the strengthening of NATO and the rearmament of West Germany. D. ACHESON, Present at the
Creation: My Years in the State Department, New York 1969, also remains useful for its extensive
attention to the American side of the EDC story.
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