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Integrating Europe or Ending the Cold War? 29
reincorporate” the Germans into the free world. Above all, the Germans had to be
fully integrated into a united western Europe. 73 In his Zurich speech he even mentioned
that he envisaged the United States of Europe as a “federal system” and the
formation of a “Council of Europe” – even if not all European states were prepared to
immediately join this system. Moreover, in the course of the speech he seemed to hint
at the possibility that Britain might be part of this scheme when saying that time was
running out as the protective shield of the atomic bomb would in a few years also
have been acquired by the enemy. “If we are to form the United States of Europe or
whatever name or form it may take, we must begin now.” But then, at the very end of
the speech, Churchill made it clear that Britain would remain outside:
“Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America, and I trust
Soviet Russia – for then indeed all would be well – must be the friends and sponsors
of the new Europe and must champion its right to live and shine.” 74
Thus, Churchill had not entirely given up his idealistic vision of a united Europe
closely associated with the Big Three: As the leaders of the United Nations, they
would guide and oversee European developments in a peaceful and co-operative
way from the outside. To Churchill Britain was still “with” Europe but not “of” it.
Since his speech at Zurich University, Churchill’s strong support for the European
unity movement was taken for granted. His audiences either entirely misunderstood
his words which distanced Britain from participation, preferred not to listen
too carefully to such statements or they hoped that Churchill did not really
mean what he said. Some of his speeches were indeed quite ambiguous. Churchill
often employed his high profile statements on European unity to embarrass the
Labour government, enhance his own profile and score political points for the Conservatives.
75 Moreover, the leader of the opposition seemed to display more pro-
European activities than the Labour government with its very cautious and reserved
attitude to the increasingly popular European unity movements. 76 Churchill, for
example, presided at the first Congress of Europe in The Hague in May 1948 while
the Labour government and the Labour party had initially called for a boycott of
the event. He used the opportunity to call upon the participants to “resolve that in
one form or another a European Assembly shall be constituted”. He was also in
73. “Foreign Affairs” speech, ibid., vol.427, 5 June 1946, col.2029; “Foreign Affairs” speech, ibid.,
vol.459, 10 Dec. 1948, col.711. See also G. A. CRAIG, “Churchill and Germany”, in BLAKE and
LOUIS (eds.), Churchill, pp.37-40.
74. R. S. CHURCHILL (ed.), Sinews of Peace, pp.197-202.
75. See for example his speech at the Albert Hall, London, 14 May 1947, when he attended a ‘United Europe
Meeting’, in R. S. CHURCHILL (ed.), Europe Unite, p.84; his “United Europe Exhibition”
speech, Dorland Hall, London, 17 November 1948, in ibid., p.466; and above all his speech on the Schuman
Plan to the House of Commons, 27 June 1950, in idem., In the Balance, pp.287 ff. G. WARNER,
“Labour Governments”, is convinced that Churchill’s and the Conservatives’ strategy “was not only
irresponsible but also hypocritical, since they were no more willing than their Labour opponents to
surrender British sovereignty to the kind of federalist authority advocated at The Hague” (pp.67-68). For
a similar view see M. CAMPS, Britain and the European Community, 1955-63, London 1964, pp.11-12.
76. See the brief overviews in D. W. URWIN, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration
since 1945, 2nd ed., London 1995, pp.1 ff.; D. DINAN, Ever Closer Union? An Introduction
to the European Community, Basingstoke 1994, pp.9 ff.