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Cold War Threats 61
tional organization”: “There is no real solution of the German problem inside Germany
alone. There is a solution inside the European-Atlantic-World
Community.” 33 Quite quickly, the practical focus came to be on the “European-
Atlantic” possibilities. The State and Defense Departments’ “one package” proposal
of September 1950, for example, zeroed in on NATO strengthening involving
Germany – stressing that the creation of “an integrated force” was “the best means
of obtaining the maximum contribution from European nations and to provide as
well a framework in which German contribution of a significant nature could be
realized.” (Italics added.) 34 In a message to Robert Schuman written two months
later, Acheson laid out his personal logic even more clearly:
“I do not need to remind you of the attitude which the Government of the United
States has displayed on innumerable occasions and in many forms, toward European
integration. We favor it. I favor it. If the European countries could work it out in a
practical manner a sound basis would be laid on which military and economic
strength could be built. A rallying point would be created around which a free and
civilized Europe could muster its energies for a successful defense (...) against the
attacks of Communist nihilism and Soviet imperialism. It would perhaps be the
soundest basis on which this generation could reinsure the next against another dangerous
German aberration.” 35
III
Two devils in the details – and the resulting conviction that “dual containment” of
both the Soviet Union and Germany was necessary: here was a situation complicated
enough to explain slow movement on German rearmament and EDC. But
there was a third devil in the details, as well, and its existence is part of the story of
how slow progress became very slow – and how even this became a dubious guarantee
of success. The United States and its European allies shared a commitment to
“dual containment,” that is, but this was a lowest common denominator in an overall
relationship that could be problematic and even volatile. While shared convictions
ultimately made important headway possible, many serious disagreements
left Washington constantly anxious over both pace and viability. At many points,
“triple containment” seemed to be the order of the day: keeping vigilant watch on
the Kremlin and Germany, while simultaneously using EDC and other mechanisms
as a way of taming difficult European behavior.
The most obvious – though not the most important – evidence of the US’s concern
regarding overall European conduct can be found in the constant expressions
of frustration over progress on NATO strengthening and German rearmament.
Although it was clear that allies appreciated the logic of using the latter to help
33. SCHWARTZ, America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany, 228.
34. FRUS, 1950, III, 274.
35. FRUS, 1950, III, 497.