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Making the International Code of Conduct Work
One of the strengths of the ICoC is that it is a proposed “soft law” measure.
At times, when some governments seem reluctant to negotiate legally binding
treaties, space security might be more easily discussed in the form of
voluntary agreements or TCBMs. A soft law can help define responsible
activities and set out agreed norms of behaviour when legally binding
agreements cannot be reached. It can also work as an intermediate step
towards legal and political measures. Furthermore the Code's non-legally
binding nature means it does not contradict any other on-going discussions,
for example on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) in
the Conference on Disarmament. Quite the opposite, the ICoC has the
potential to stimulate the discussions on a treaty preventing the placement of
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weapons in outer space (PPWT).
Despite the fact that the ICoC was originally drafted by the EU member
states, the process of developing it further has included a number of regional
meetings and international consultations. These regional meetings and
international consultations have enabled participation from emerging space
actors and states with a future interest in space. Since its launch in 2012, the
process to finalise an ICoC has aimed to be an inclusive process, open to all
states interested in the issue. The different regional seminars, organised
through the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, have
enabled the creation of more in-depth knowledge for emerging space actors,
giving these governments a better platform to engage in the international
consultations regarding the code. The regional meetings fostered more
detailed discussions around space security and allowed for many states with
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smaller space programmes to have a stronger voice on this issue.
However, the process to negotiate an ICoC has also highlighted certain
tensions between states with more advanced space programmes and
emerging space actors. When the Soviet Union and the U.S. first embarked
on their space activities, hardly any limitations or restrictions were in place,
which made it both easier and cheaper for them to develop their national
space programmes.
However, the process
to negotiate an ICoC
has also highlighted
certain tensions
between states with
more advanced
space programmes
and emerging space
actors. When the
Soviet Union and the
U.S. first embarked on
their space activities,
hardly any limitations
or restrictions were in
place, which made it
both easier and
cheaper for them to
develop their national
space programmes.
Much like in climate change discussions, several emerging space actors are
now reluctant to develop restrictions on space activities. It could be argued
that international rules could mean constraints for the development of their
space programme, which could lead to slowing down national development.
ICoC for Outer Space Activities: An Industry Perspective | www.orfonline.org 121