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formulated by the EU, is nevertheless encouraging its elaboration and
negotiations into a form that it can sign.
But these states are already heavily invested in space, space services, the
minimisation of debris, and appear to have abandoned any ambition for
kinetic anti-satellite weapons (ASATs). If the code was narrowly intended to
stigmatise practices by space-capable states that would create long-lasting
space debris such as the Chinese ASAT test, it appears to have already been a
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success. No similar test has been performed since, even by China. And it is
now well-established that any such test would be costly and bring the censure
of the world.
But if the Code is to truly become a broader instrument, one that establishes
a regime that creates a least-regret path toward the greatest flourishing of
humanity-benefiting space activity—which is certainly in the interests of all
states—it is absolutely critical that the space-capable Asian states: China,
India, and Japan feel a sense of ownership over the Code.
For this to happen, these states must feel that they have materially shaped the
Code to reflect their interests. This is likely to be difficult because the
problem these states have with the Code is less its content and more the
manner in which it came to them.
These states rightly perceive that they are legitimate, fully established powers
on the international stage, as well as fully established spacefaring states, and
that they deserve an equal voice in any rule-making. Moreover they are likely
to feel that they have a disproportionate interest in such rule-making because
they are the most affected by any such rule. Unlike the states of the EU, the
Asian space powers exist outside a stabilizing regional security architecture.
Instead they are faced with an anarchic environment with security concerns
on all sides, multiple security dilemmas leading to a need for “self-help.”
Regrettably such self-help encourages similar actions from others, creating a
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multi-party security dilemma that worsens the situation for all. A non-legally
binding instrument appears to constrain this self-help without providing the
security of a binding regime. Unlike the Cold War space powers who tested,
deployed, and then eschewed kinetic ASAT weapons as they became more
invested and dependent upon space, the rising powers of Asia feel
themselves technologically behind in an area that appears to provide some
coercive or deterrent value, and have yet to reach an equivalent level of
28 | Awaiting Launch: Perspectives on the Draft ICoC for Outer Space Activities