Defence Forces Review 2008

Lessons from Kosovo
There is now better co-ordination between UNMIK and KFOR. Joint contingency plans
have been created and joint operations to improve communication, command and control
have taken place. KFOR also established small mobile liaison and monitoring teams for
each municipality. These are the eyes and ears of KFOR on the ground, and reflect a tactical
change from static positions to less predictable and more responsive patrolling involving
special focus on liaison with local communities and monitoring vulnerable areas. An essential
element in their job is establishing contact with local religious, political, and village leaders,
police, and similar persons. Having observed these operating in the Irish area, they proved
highly effective. The Kosovo Police Service is now better equipped and trained to deal with
crowd control and public order, and special units have been set up for this purpose. The police
now have inter-ethnic officers appointed to police stations, and Minority Issues Officers to
regional police headquarters. Although all of these have yet to be tested in practice, there is a
realisation that the events of March 2004 must never be allowed to reoccur.
Co n c l u s i o n
The litmus test for determining the nature of a UN operation, i.e. peacekeeping or peace
enforcement, remains the ability and willingness to resort to the use of force. Despite this, the
dividing line between the use of force in self-defence on traditional peacekeeping operations,
and that on peace enforcement operations is not so clear in practice. Much will depend on
subjective variables that are difficult to predict; and these may influence the way in which a
mandate is interpreted and applied.
In a more contrite view in the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General noted
that, in some cases, peacekeeping forces are delegated tasks that ‘can on occasion exceed the
mission of peacekeeping forces and the expectations of peacekeeping force contributors’. 49 It
would appear that the Secretary-General’s analysis that peace enforcement is a viable option
for coalitions of the willing, but not UN controlled missions, is a realistic assessment of the
political and military reality of UN peace support operations. 50
Consent and co-operation of all parties to a conflict remains a fundamental characteristic
of traditional peacekeeping operations. Linked to this is the need for impartiality in all UN
operations. The Brahimi Report has noted that while this means adherence to the principles
of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate, it is not the same as equal treatment
of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to appeasement. 51 In situations
of contemporary conflict, local parties may ‘not consist of moral equals but of obvious
aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using
force, but morally compelled to do so’. Genocide in Rwanda was able to go as far as it did in
part because of a failure of the international community (through the auspices of the UN) to
oppose obvious evil. Ethnic cleansing of the remaining minority population in Kosovo must
be prevented. However, permitting one country to determine the nature and extent of the use
of force is not likely in the best interests of the UN, and allows a degree of ‘limited liability’
for that country in the event of things going wrong. 52 When this happened in Somalia, the
United States extricated itself with relative ease, while the UN was used as a scapegoat for
the manner in which events unfolded.
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