Defence Forces Review 2008

Defence Forces Review 2008
international legitimacy for its actions in the international arena. While the Bush administration
ultimately relinquished the prospect of UNSC approval for intervention in Iraq, it did so
only after a considerable diplomatic offensive to acquire it. Even without formal approval
for the war some commentators attempted to justify / legitimise the campaign on the basis
of a refined interpretation of prior UN resolutions. Bellinger (2003) suggests that because
Iraq materially breached the Weapons of Mass Destruction obligations of the 1991 ceasefire
provided by UNSCR 687, which were essential to the restoration of peace and security in the
area, the use of force was authorised under UNSCR 678 (the resolution covering the first Gulf
War). Furthermore the US administration was quick to seek approval for the continued US
presence in Iraq through UNSCR 1546 (Gilmore, 2004). The current sole global superpower,
despite its undoubted military and economic capabilities, has and will continue to value the
legitimacy conferred on its actions through UN approval. Even hard nosed neo conservatives
such as Robert Kagan (2004) insist that the US requires international legitimacy, not only for
narrow aims of maximising cooperation but because its absence is paralysing and debilitating
for any liberal democracy.
Thirdly the argument that the UN is on a path of inevitable decline is ahistoric as it fails to
properly recognise the ebb and flow of the fortunes of the organisation since its inception. During
over fifty years of successful operations there have been setbacks, failures and challenges to the
UN’s authority. Physical attacks on UN personnel and infrastructure are not recent phenomena,
rather they form part of the hostile environment in which UN peacekeeping operates. This has
been illustrated as far back as 1948 when the UN envoy mediating in the Israeli / Palestinian
crisis, Count Folke Bernadotte, was assassinated by Jewish activists in Jerusalem.
Finally the UN’s handling of the Iraq crisis may have increased its prestige rather than
diminish it. Hans Blix (2005) argues that the UN has been strengthened by its refusal to
endorse the American led intervention in Iraq. This action demonstrated a commitment to
independent action by refusing to bend to the will of its most powerful member. The integrity
and independence of the organisation was further reinforced when the rationale for initiating
hostilities was subsequently exposed as baseless.
The empirical evidence highlights that the UN role in peacekeeping is not only active but
enjoys a functional working relationship with the US. It remains in a position therefore, to
continue to play a significant role in international conflict management.
‘Ol d Wi n e in Ne w Bo t t l e s’ Th e OSCE
The OSCE originated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in the
mid 1970s as a forum to ease tension between the Cold War rival blocs. Its broad mandate
encompasses a wide range of political, economic and military activities to address security
concerns. The potential for increased military security activities arose at the end of the
Cold War when it became active in conflict resolution in a number of former Soviet states.
However the prospects from the early 1990s of creating a substantial troop heavy capability
have not been realised. So for example, the High Level Planning Group (HLPG) established
in 1994 has no immediate prospect of implementing its mission plan. It was established to
conduct operational contingency planning for a possible deployment, by direction of a UNSC
Resolution, of a multi national OSCE peacekeeping force into the Nagorno Karabakh area
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