Defence Forces Review 2008

Defence Forces Review 2008
However, in the case of KFOR, the ROE were of little value. Although KFOR forces are said
to operate under NATO command and control, and ROE, the reality is different and more
complex. Each contingent has its own set of ROE based on the KFOR ROE and standard
operating procedures. In this way, they possessed modifications reflecting national laws and
policies. In 2000, when the Force Commander of KFOR, Major General Wirth, was asked
about the ROE of national contingents, he said that each has its own ‘limitations’ and was
free to define its commitments, within NATO doctrine and standard operating procedures. 27
For this reason it is essential for a brigade commander to know each contingent’s ROE. An
international brigade commander can deliberately select and commit a foreign contingent
with more flexible engagement constraints than other contingents. 28 The Scandinavian
contingents, for example, use dogs in crowd control situations. This is not permitted under
Irish ROE. Similarly, the Irish ROE do not permit the use of CS (tear gas) or similar gas,
or rubber/plastic bullets. One senior Irish officer described how he had never heard of the
KFOR ROE. There was no mention of these during pre-deployment training in Sweden, and
he had not encountered them while on duty in Kosovo. 29 The prevailing situation is that each
contingent applied its own national ROE during a wave of anti-minority violence that took
place in Kosovo in March 2004 and the overall result was chaotic. Moreover, to designate
force protection as the main pillar of your ROE has been described as military cowardice that
encourages an overly defensive and non-deterrent posture. 30 Ultimately this encourages the
more extreme elements to test the parameters of what is acceptable behaviour.
The difficulties associated with the military integration of multinational forces are significant,
but no real effort was made to ensure uniform adoption and application of ROE among KFOR
contingents. It is clear that ROE can be different from one nation to another. It is as if NATO
has a catalogue in which are listed all the ROE. Finding the lowest common denominator is not
enough as there will always be times when a state makes national reservations based on political
or similar concerns. 31 Sometimes, differences in interpretation of ROE are more semantic than
substantive. 32 General Tieszen, a former military commander in Kosovo, commented that one
difference between the United States ROE and others was that the United States emphasized
the right of self-protection quickly, without hesitation. They also emphasized the use of direct
fire and only that fire necessary to defend life. Use of lethal force was also permitted to protect
certain designated critical persons other than a member of the American forces which were
usually kept classified, and certain designated critical facilities and property. 33 The American
contingent was also very constrained in their use of warning shots because of the belief in
the propensity of such action to escalate quickly into direct firefights. Some national ROE
permitted liberal resort to warning shots, and such behaviour, while complying with the
relevant national ROE, making other contingents in Kosovo nervous.
The German contingent with KFOR also encountered difficulty with its ROE and was
widely criticized for the way it reacted to the March 2004 riots. At the time, German soldiers
were supposed to be able to defend Serbian-Orthodox religious structures only if attacked
themselves by the perpetrators of pogroms. In the wake of the riots, a review was conducted
which called for a change to the German ROE. Subsequent adaptations to the rules permitted
the issuance of tear gas and riot gear, and cleared up ambiguities to ensure that the troops felt
able to act forcefully before lives became directly threatened.
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