Defence Forces Review 2008

Defence Forces Review 2008
The recommendations of the Brahimi Report are commendable, especially the need to provide
mission leadership with strategic guidance. But this is a high reaching goal, given the fact
that UN controlled forces are generally not even given adequate capabilities to intimidate
or enforce. Another UN report is unlikely to change this historical fact. The British ‘Wider
Peacekeeping’ concept is one of the more lucid explanations on the use of force and permits
its initiation in circumstances other than in self-defence. 53 However, it must be proportional,
applied impartially, and have the consent of a majority of the significant parties. 54 It must also
contribute to the accomplishment of the mandate in the longer term.
In the course of the UN operation in the Congo in the 1960’s, the principle of the non- use of
force except in self-defence was applied. 55 In that instance, some critics concluded that the
emphasis on self-defence was too rigid in view of the functions of the mission and that, in
practice, it could not be followed. 56 During the operation, the Secretary-General was criticised
for his failure to appreciate the essential link between the right of self-defence and the right
to freedom of movement. The ground rules for the use of force in the Congo changed as the
mission progressed and in this way it could be described as the first instance of ‘mission
creep’. The right to use force was extended, but the exact limitations on it were unclear.
However, despite authorisation to use force in the prevention of civil war ‘as a last resort’, and
in the apprehension of foreign mercenaries, the UN still considered itself bound by respect
for state sovereignty. 57
The UN Secretary-General has overall responsibility for the conduct of UN commanded
peacekeeping missions and as such he has to be mindful of the views of the troop contributing
states. 58 Without their support in the first instance, it would not be possible to field or maintain
a UN force on the ground.
The Secretary-General’s report on the fall of Srebrenica concluded that the cardinal lesson of
that awful sequence of events is that ‘a deliberate and systematic attempt to terrorize, expel
or murder an entire people must be met decisively with all necessary means’, and it accused
the UN of ‘pervasive ambivalence… regarding the role of force in the pursuit of peace; [and]
an institutional ideology of impartiality when confronted with an attempted genocide’. 59 This
view is consistent with the robust doctrine advocated in the Brahimi Report.
The violence in Kosovo and the killings of members of both communities highlights the
deficiencies in the security environment provided by KFOR. The actual ROE provide
ample opportunity and legal justification for resort to force when necessary. What is needed
is the will to do so. Had a firm and consistent policy been adopted in the early stages of
deployment by UNMIK and KFOR, many believe the violence and ethnic tensions endemic
to Kosovo could have been reduced significantly. The separate KFOR brigades are controlled
like independent fiefdoms, with little or no central command, and significant variations in
policy and procedures. There is no real effort to subordinate the military operation to NATO
procedures or command. Even within brigade areas there are no common standing operations
procedures, and national policies take precedence. Deploying conscript soldiers with little
experience and inadequate training for the situation is Kosovo is part of the problem. Some
contingents should not be there, and those that are must have proper training and equipment.
Deploying lightly armed peacekeepers like UNPROFOR creates expectations that cannot be
90