Defence Forces Review 2008

Defence Forces Review 2008
operations from July 1 2007 to June 30 2008 is $7 billion. In comparison, the estimated warrelated
spending for Iraq has risen from $53 billion in 2003 to $133 billion in 2007. And these
financial costs don’t take into account the political costs of such unilateral interventions to
the international legitimacy of the United States and other relevant actors, whether states or
international organizations. Peace operations are therefore a necessity and a resource that
should be used. And now is the time to assess how they can be best effective. Now is the
time, also, to examine what it would take for member states and the UN to truly make peace
operations part of a comprehensive portfolio of measures, from conflict prevention to postbuilding
reconstruction.
Beyond the specifics of how America can contribute operationally to the success of
peacekeeping, the U.S. government can meet its international responsibilities only by
fundamentally altering its foreign policy. To take UN peace operations seriously and
consequently invest strategically in them, the United States needs to become aware, at the
general level of international affairs, of the necessity to link more closely power and legitimacy
as well as solidarity and security. In turn, this entails several fundamental changes in the ways
American foreign policy is conceptualized and implemented. They include: finding a better
balance between national and international interests; coming to terms with the foreign policy
implications of U.S. democratic values; exercising leadership within multilateral constraints;
and overcoming the parochial characteristics of American foreign policy.
Pr o s p e c t s Dim
What are the chances for these changes to happen as well as for peacekeeping to become a
better tool of conflict management in the near future The chances are, admittedly, rather
slim, for three fundamental reasons.
First, the foreign policy of the Bush administration since 2001 departs in practically every
respect from the directions advocated here, and this will not change until the end of 2008.
Furthermore, it is uncertain that American foreign policy will evolve even beyond the current
administration. After all, the Bush administration foreign policy has not been a revolution but
rather a radical version of enduring strains in American foreign policy and its conception of
the country’s place in the world.
Second, there is no serious desire among member states to discuss how to trigger change,
followed by real action. This applies to peacekeeping. As such, the gap between rhetoric and
reality remains a major issue, unlikely to be solved any time soon at the global level. The mere
fact that UN reform is a constant item on the multilateral agenda shows how little progress is
being done in this area. Third, and finally, it is difficult to see how the UN secretariat, short
of benefiting from a very strong financial and political commitment from member states, can
address and redress on its own the systemic shortcomings of peacekeeping operations.
More than 15 years after the end of the Cold War, international life is still crippled by
conflicts. Peacekeeping operations have expanded to meet some of these challenges. While
some of the shortcomings of peacekeeping can be placed on the UN’s shoulders, the main
problem lies with the strongest member states. In this perspective, only when the United
States decides to recognize international constraints and play by the global rules will the
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