Defence Forces Review 2008

Lessons from Kosovo
The Brahimi Report states that UN military units must be capable of defending themselves,
other mission components and the mission’s mandate. 34 It recommends that ROE should ‘not
limit contingents to stroke by stroke responses but should allow ripostes sufficient to silence
a source of deadly fire that is directed at UN troops or at the people they are charged to
protect’. 35 In particular, dangerous situations should not force the UN to cede the initiative to
attackers. In essence, the Brahimi Report advocates the adoption of a more robust doctrine
and realistic mandates, that should specify an operation’s authority to use force. 36
Ma r c h 2004 Ri o t s
There was a creeping erosion of the authority of KFOR almost from the first days of deployment.
In March 2004, the long simmering tensions beneath the surface in Kosovo boiled over into
large scale civil unrest and violence. In this case the target of the Albanian groups was not
just the minority Serb community, but also the UN personnel and equipment. Rioting mobs
of youths were responsible for nineteen deaths and over nine hundred injuries, as well as
the displacement of some 4500 people. 37 In addition, sixty five international police officers,
fifty eight Kosovo Police Service (KPS) officers and sixty one members of KFOR suffered
injuries. The implications for the future of Kosovo remain serious. The UNMIK and KFOR
response showed a lack of resolve, and the lessons of these events were not lost on extremists
in Kosovo and the neighbouring region.
The French were criticised for their failure to act appropriately in attempting to prevent Serb
demonstrators from attacking Albanians, an assessment the French forcefully rejected. 38 The
argument was made that protecting property is not a priority of the KFOR mission and that,
for this reason it would have been wrong to use deadly force for this purpose. The French
interpretation of the mandate and ROE was narrow and controversial. The contingent’s priority
in Mitrovica was force protection, protection of the local population, and protection of KFOR
installations and equipment. KFOR ROE appear to allow, under certain circumstance, the use
of force against civilians engaged in demonstrations or riots or who commit or threaten to
commit serious crimes in the presence of KFOR forces, or who pose a threat to the security of
individuals or property of persons connected with KFOR or the international civilian missions
in Kosovo.
Many international workers were critical of a perceived unwillingness by French KFOR troops
to provide them with sufficient protection (their facilities and vehicles in particular had been
the object of attack). In a thinly veiled criticism of KFOR, the head of the UNHCR operations
in Kosovo asserted that international workers should not be ‘sitting ducks’ and threatened to
withdraw if UNHCR continued to be targeted by the local population. 39 UN police were also
often critical of the lack of support they received in carrying out their policing duties.
The level of violence was increasing steadily since the end of 2003. Under pressure to show
some progress in the overall political situation, UNMIK and KFOR facilitated the creation of
an illusion of normalisation. 40 Despite this, the outbreak of violence over the two day period
from 17 to 18 March 2004 did not come as a surprise. It was said that in at the time KFOR
and UNMIK very nearly lost control of Kosovo. UNMIK established a Crisis Management
Review Body to examine how it dealt with the situation and determine how it might do better.
But allegations of a cover up quickly emerged. 41 Members of the minority population were
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