Defence Forces Review 2008

Defence Forces Review 2008
3. The UN could not become a party to internal conflicts. UN troops could not be used
to enforce any specific political situation.
4. The force was supposed to have freedom of movement throughout the Congo.
5. UN troops could use force only in self-defence and could not exercise any initiative
in the use of armed force.
6. The composition of the force would be decided by the Secretary-General, although
the views of the host country could be considered.
7. National units in the UN force would take orders only from the UN and not from
their home governments.
Additionally those troops who arrived in the Congo were lightly armed. They were equipped
and briefed for what could best be described as a police-type action involving the restoration
of law and order and dealing with recalcitrant members of the mutinous ANC. By 15 July,
more than 1,200 troops were on the ground, and within a month the total had soared to 14,000
drawn from 24 states. In terms of the numbers involved, and the scope of the mission, this was
a force of unprecedented magnitude but in order to have any prospect of success clear mission
objectives with defined command, control, and communications systems were required.
Whether the United Nations could actually control such a force was distinctly unclear.
In t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n ONUC a n d t h e Co n g o l e s e Go v e r n m e n t
However, the root of post-deployment difficulties lay in the erratic personality of Patrice
Lumumba. In 1960 there seemed little doubt that Lumumba was under the influence of
Communist advisors. Even UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold believed this to be true and
the Prime Minister showed little interest in cooperating with the UN in its efforts to restore
order and deal with the secessionist province of Katanga where President Moise Tshombe,
with the assistance of Belgian officers and civilian advisors, had established an oasis of
relative tranquillity.
Tshombe persistently refused to admit UN troops, while Lumumba demanded that the UN
expel the Belgians from Katanga and compel Tshombe to end his secession. Hammarskjold
could not do this without violating all of his own ground rules and while he personally led
the first ONUC contingent into Katanga in a move to establish the UN’s right to freedom of
movement, this did nothing to resolve the political impasse.
The ONUC force comprised troops from Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon,
Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Malaya,
Federation of Mali, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Sierra
Leone, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. Cultural, linguistic
and economic factors were to become major issues when it came to leading and administering
such a force and the situation was compounded by the attitude of the host country who the UN
were supposed to be assisting.
Documents compiled by Canadian staff officers at the time show that while the Congo
government invited the UN to come into their country in order to establish law and order
and restore economic life, the Prime Minister and some of his colleagues quickly became
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