Defence Forces Review 2008

‘New’ versus ‘No’ World Order
addressing the conflict over that territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The inability of
the organisation to influence the parties to the conflict, however, indicates that this planning
has no apparent chance of being realised in the near future. This inability stems from the fact
that the OSCE suffers from the same handicap as the UN in that it represents a large amorphous
group of states stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok that struggle to reach agreement
where member state interests are perceived to be threatened. Organisational cohesion will
continue to suffer due to Russian antipathy to the organisation in the wake of criticial election
and human rights monitoring activities conducted by the OSCE both in Russia itself and
in former Soviet states over the last decade. In this environment complex mandates with
rigorous enforcement mechanisms are unlikely to be approved and the OSCE is more likely
to engage in niche operations for the foreseeable future.
Tr a n s a t l a n t i c Co o p e r t i o n t h r o u g h NATO
The issues around NATO and peacekeeping are complex. The collapse of the Soviet Union
removed the predominant threat of the previous fifty years of an attack by massed Soviet
Armies. This threat disappeared almost overnight and left the alliance searching for an
appropriate role in the post cold war environment. Peacekeeping was an obvious option and
when both UN and EU efforts to resolve the Yugoslavia crisis collapsed spectacularly, NATO
had found a crisis to deal with. Since the early 1990s the alliance has expanded accepting new
member states and partners to cooperate with on agreed projects through the PFP process.
It has also been effectively subcontracted by the UN to conduct peace operations in Bosnia
(IFOR then SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR) as well taking over the running of the UN sanctioned
(UNSCR 1386) ISAF Mission in Afghanistan.
Despite the growth of the alliance and the deployment to the distant region of central Asia,
NATO is unlikely to assume a lead in global peacekeeping. Success in Bosnia and Kosovo
suggests that NATO will continue to lead certain peace operations authorised by the UN, but
it will not assume responsibility for interventions in distant regions where no direct threat
to a member exists (in the case of Afghanistan the US considered the Taleban / Al Quaida
government a direct threat to its national security). There are obvious logistical and cost
factors supporting this strategy but there are also a number of other factors at play. First of
all the increase in members will make political consensus difficult. At the time of writing the
further expansion of the organisation is under consideration. This will further complicate the
achievement of consensus something that has been exacerbated by extant internal differences
between the US supported by the UK and other European member States. The alliance will
not unnecessarily antagonise other regional powers or power centres unless interests are
immediately and directly threatened. Finally NATO reflects the UN in that it will act where
the direct or perceived interests of powerful alliance members are threatened and unwilling to
either over extend itself or take on moral tasks where they are not.
Th e EU ‘Pe a c e k e e p i n g f r o m Ve n u s’
The European Union has been struggling to assert itself as a player in conflict resolution since
the end of the cold war. If altruism initially drove this policy the eruption of conflict in the
former Yugoslavia gave it a hard-edged practical significance. The failure to deal effectively
with the crisis on a political level indicated how unprepared the organisation was to deal with
complex security problems. Since then it has developed a number of mechanisms for dealing
111