Defence Forces Review 2008

Defence Forces Review 2008
Even his transfer from UNTSO in the Middle East had difficulties. The aircraft flying him
to Africa broke down and arriving on 18 July he immediately objected to decisions already
made by the UN political leadership which he felt were degrading his force’s ability to
conduct military operations. So strongly did he feel about this that he threatened to resign
on three separate occasions in the month following his arrival. The first occurred when
Hammarskjold turned down a request for a larger force to implement the mandate. The second
crisis erupted when von Horn discovered that all of his communications were being filtered
through a civilian sieve before reaching their destination at UN Headquarters in New York.
But the straw that nearly broke the camel’s back, and consequently was to cause morale and
operational problems for the ONUC troops on the ground, was the political decision to return
arms previously seized from ANC units in UN raids.
Added to these complications was the increasingly erratic and hostile attitude of the Congolese
government to ONUC forces. A state of martial law was declared in August with demands
that all UN personnel, civil and military, carry ID and produce it on request to the Congolese
authorities. While this could be interpreted as the fledgling state simply trying to assert its
authority, it also seriously impeded the conduct of ONUC operations.
Canadian staff officers at ONUC Headquarters reporting on the situation stated that ONUC
was primarily a civilian organisation with a military component. Having started with a handful
of UN officials under Bunche, and a small group of officers (mostly Canadian) borrowed
from UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force) in Sinai and UNTSO, the organisation had
mushroomed into an awesome establishment, but lacked cohesion, know-how and any real
practical authority. The Canadians stated that “for weeks, civilians, officers and other ranks
have been pouring in from all over the world; people who have little in common and who
are tied by strings which prevent or restrict their use. This rapid expansion of HQ ONUC,
seemingly without any plan, has resulted in most of the effort being directed at their own
administration to the detriment of the 18,000 troops spread over a territory as large as
the whole of Ontario but without its means of communications. This situation, together
with an almost total lack of telephonic communication between offices and an impossible
accommodation set up has caused intolerable delay, confusion and frustration right from the
start and the end is not yet in sigh.”
By late 1960, von Horn had fallen into ill health and had withdrawn more and more from
operational decision-making. His senior staff officers were now despairing and in December
von Horn returned to UNTSO when a new ONUC force commander was appointed to take his
place - General Sean McKeown from Ireland 1 .
While McKeown’s main problem was stabilising the Congo he also had the added difficulty
associated with the politically sensitive nature of his planning staff. The officers a commanding
general has to assist him are crucial in the formulation of strategy and implementation of
policy. Staff officers are the general’s hands, eyes and ears and normally will have been
assembled over a number of years. They are usually bright up-and-coming officers who,
in addition to being professionally competent, will also be attuned to the personality and
nuances of their commander. Such cohesion in times of stress can be the difference between
operational success and tactical failure.
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