Defence Forces Review 2008

Defence Forces Review 2008
about the use of force. 11 However, there was a significant evolution in the guidelines since
UNEF I 12 , and it was the arrangements for UNEF II (1973-79) 13 that marked a turning point
in the official UN language, where the authority to use force in self-defence was deemed to
include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under
the mandate. This significantly broadened the definition of self-defence, giving considerably
greater latitude to Force Commanders than previously was the case, and became the precedent
for all major UN peacekeeping operations thereafter, including UNIFIL. 14
In the past, the policy adopted by UN member states effectively allowed the Security Council
to assign peacekeeping forces almost any task, however ill thought out or unrealistic, in
the expectation that it could use force under the guise of self-defence and still retain its
peacekeeping status. During the Bosnian war, the political imperative to be seen ‘doing
something’ led to the creation of ‘safe havens’, but ignored the wider military implications of
the duty to protect those havens. 15 It was not a role that could realistically be undertaken by
lightly armed peacekeepers. Although Resolution 836 (1993) delegated the power to member
states, acting individually or through regional arrangement, to take military action in Bosnia-
Herzegovina to protect safe areas, it remained unclear who should decide when force should
be used and for what purpose. 16 The UN will only acknowledge such a duty if member states
agree to provide requisite support and means. The experience of UNIFIL shows that this has
also been a difficult problem for traditional peacekeeping operations. 17
Events in Kosovo, especially during early 2004, show that this is not an easy matter to deal
with in practice. The roots of the problems confronting UNMIK and KFOR can be traced to
the weak policy adopted in the early stages of deployment which, in turn, was based on flawed
analysis and fear of taking forceful measures to deal with extremists on all sides. Central to this
was a policy of eschewing the use of force in favour of a kid gloves approach that contributed
to the breakdown of law and order. Consequently, the protection of vulnerable groups and the
creation of a secure environment were not achieved. A worst case scenario presented itself in
March 2004, whereby the failure of international security forces to resort to force to protect
the minority population was an abdication of their responsibility and a failure to implement
the mandate. A combination of factors led to the outbreak of violence. There was the growing
frustration among the Albanian population arising from the ambiguous constitutional status
of Kosovo itself, and disillusionment with the UNMIK administration. 18 UNMIK came to be
viewed as an inept and even corrupt international neo-colonial presence that has done little to
stem the widespread crime, unemployment and poverty. In addition, respect for KFOR was
severely undermined by its uncoordinated response to the outbreak of violence in 2004.
Th e Es t a b l i s h m e n t o f UNMIK a n d De p l o y m e n t o f KFOR
The legal basis for the establishment of an international military presence in Kosovo is
Resolution 1244(1999). 19 This sets out the mandate of KFOR and very broadly outlines the
responsibilities of the international security presence. These include:
• Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced person can
return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transition
administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered.
• Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take
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