Defence Forces Review 2008

Lessons from The Congo
antagonistic to white troops in particular and to the UN force in general. The Canadians stated
that it was becoming more obvious with each passing day that a police state was in the making
and that pressure from the UN was the only deterrent.
Ir i s h Pr e p a r e d n e s s f o r Ov e r s e a s Op e r a t i o n s
By 1960 Ireland had already seconded troops to the UN but this was in the low-profile capacity
of unarmed observers to UNOGIL (United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon) mission in
1958 and thereafter to UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation) in the Middle
East. Therefore, when the request arrived from UN Headquarters in New York to supply a
full infantry battalion to ONUC, military planners at Defence Force Headquarters in Dublin
knew it would be a watershed in Irish military history. To appreciate fully the magnitude of
what was being asked of the Irish Army, one must understand the state of the Irish military in
the late 1950s. In the words of Noel Carey, then an enthusiastic young lieutenant and platoon
commander, the Army was “run down, lacked financing and direction, and its mission was not
clearly defined”. Military duties consisted of ceremonial activity and limited Aid to the Civil
Power in the context of the IRA border campaign which was beginning at that time. Carey
recalled that he spent a three-month period on the border where his soldiers were carrying out
essential duties such as setting up roadblocks and patrolling with the Gardaí. The work was
interesting and demanding but once back in barracks the tedium was worse than ever. “Sport
was very important to me and helped to keep me motivated”, he said, “however, there was a
distinct lack of adventure in the army at this time”
Carey’s words sum up what, for many soldiers, was reality at that time. For some the army
was simply a staging post, a chance to earn and save money before they left for pastures
greener in the US or Australia. For others it was simply a straightforward way to keep a roof
over their heads and feed their families – but a glorious career it was not. At this point very
few serving soldiers had seen active service and only a small number of senior officers had
seen some form of action in the War of Independence and during the Civil War.
Le a d e r s h i p o f ONUC – Wh o Wa s t o Co m m a n d a n d Ho w
Following initial confusion about who was to be the senior ONUC military officer Major Gen
Carl von Horn from Sweden was the one who took the reins of leadership. However the main
problem he faced was rooted in the fact that the ONUC military leadership was hamstrung by
the ONUC civilian leadership who insisted on taking operational decisions which they were
ill-equipped to make. ONUC was composed of both a military and civil wing with the heads
of both operations subordinated to a Special Representative, Dr Ralph Bunche, who reported
directly to Secretary General Hammarskjold. This created major problems for von Horn
who upon arrival at Leopoldville found the military side of the mission in total chaos with
ONUC and its military staff planners completely incapable of filling the vacuum created by
the quick departure of the Belgian government. It was clear there was an intense need for an
international force to restore order but in a subsequent book on his peacekeeping experiences,
Soldiering for Peace, von Horn confirmed all of his difficulties particularly the poor facilities
and lack of communications.
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