Defence Forces Review 2008

Defence Forces Review 2008
with such issues and has begun to engage in a wide range of both civil and military peace
related activities under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Thus ‘Eufor’
missions have sprung up in the Balkans (where NATO went before e.g. Bosnia Herzegovina)
and in Africa (DR Congo and Tchad). The EU is also a strategic partner in the road map process
for the Israeli / Palestinian conflict. Cynical commentators have compared EU successes
and expansion of its participation in peacekeeping as akin to doing the dishes after the big
players (the US and NATO) have prepared and eaten the dinner (Kagan, 2002). As much
as the emerging mechanisms reflect flexibility in dealing with major crises it could also be
argued that they represent the EU’s extreme difficulty in adopting and subsequently enforcing
common foreign security policy. For example after much fanfare the stood up Nordic Battle
Group (NBG) now stands idle in response to the humanitarian crisis in Tchad while an ad hoc
Eufor is deployed to deal with it. It is not necessary to analyse the national and organisational
policies that created this situation, for this paper’s purpose it suffices to point out that there is
clearly a disconnect in the EU’s strategy / policy process that allows this to happen.
Ireland, who has supported these various developments most notably by providing the
Operational Commander and a heavy troop commitment to Eufor Tchad, will be encouraged
to continue to support such initiatives with ‘boots on the ground.’ In some respect it will be
regarded as a return on the investment of structural funds and decades of assistance from
the EU / EEC as well as recognition of an increased capability of the state to contribute
(due to economic growth) to EU activities. It will be difficult to avoid such commitments,
as our EU partners are unlikely to disproportionately shoulder the burden of hard security
duties. The recent complaints by the US and Britain within NATO over the reluctance of
some alliance members to commit troops to the more dangerous operational environment of
Southern Afghanistan (Wyat & Robson, 2008), indicate the potential future pressures for EU
member states to support mutually agreed peace support security operations with troops on
the ground. The Defence Forces can expect to continue to participate in future EU security
initiatives. Such activity flows on logically from our cooperation on economic, social and
other political matters.
The EU is still only at the preliminary stages of developing a truly common security and
defence policy. Until it evolves further the organisation will not be in a position to truly
undertake the role of a global player in conflict resolution. The national tensions that dog both
the UN and NATO are inherent in the EU structure. Furthermore, despite the expansion of
membership to the East, many parties to conflicts in Africa and Asia view the EU as an agent
of colonialism and are sceptical about its true intentions in conflict intervention. It is this point
of legitimacy that underlines a preference for a UN security presence or at least a mandate
from the UN Security Council by participants to conflicts. The UN will therefore continue to
play a significant role no matter how the EU develops its conflict management capabilities.
‘So m e ’ Wo r l d Or d e r f o r t h e 20t h Ce n t u r y
The 21st Century peacekeeping environment has significantly evolved since the end of the
Cold War. The threats to international order manifest themselves differently through terrorism
and asymmetric activities but there is nothing to indicate that the root causes of these threats;
inequalities in the distribution of power and resources have changed in any way. The UN
for all its faults will continue to be the preferred agent to deal with these roots because it
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