Defence Forces Review 2008

The Process of Reform in United Nations Peace Operations
former peacekeeper) to develop recommendations that would effectively end tolerance for
such crimes, increase reporting of such abuse and produce appropriately severe punishments
for any UN personnel engaging in such acts. He presented his findings in March 2005 13 ,
which were adopted by the General Assembly in 2005. These reforms included developing
a permanent capacity in DPKO HQ and each mission to address conduct and discipline
issues, including sexual exploitation and abuse, for all categories of peacekeeping personnel.
Difficulties have been encountered with some Member States in processing punishments as
the United Nations has no authorisation to do so directly for uniformed personnel. This is a
national responsibility. In this regard, the organisation depends on Member States to help
ensure that contingent commanders understand and take seriously, their responsibilities and
are accountable for the action of their troops. This can be difficult to achieve considering the
‘cultural divide’ between peacekeeping Member States.
Mi l i t a r y Division
In line with the Brahimi Report the Military Division was restructured in 2001 to consist of the
Office of the Military Adviser with four distinct services: Planning, Current Operations, Force
Generation and Training & Evaluation with each headed by an officer of Colonel rank. The
Civilian Police Unit was moved out of the Military Division and reconstituted as a separate
division with an upgraded rank of Civilian Police Adviser. Subsequent changes have included
removing the Training and Evaluation Service from the Military Division and renaming it the
Integrated Training Service in 2005 (despite the concerns of the Military Division), attaching
military officers to the Office of Operations as members of the integrated operational teams
in 2008 (also opposed by the military) and the renaming of the Military Division to that of
the Office of Military Affairs. There is a concern that, in losing the Evaluation and Training
Service and having many military officers attached to the Office of Operations as members
of the integrated operational teams, the Military Division will lose its own identity and the
military chain of command will suffer, accordingly. It may be interesting to note that while
NATO has over 1000 staff in its military planning division alone, The UN has only 57 military
officers of which 15 are planners supporting 17 missions. 14
131