Defence Forces Review 2008

More documents

Recommendations

Info

A United Nations Emergency Peace Service A United Nations Emergency Peace Service: To Prevent Genocide and Crimes against Humanity Robert C. Johansen Th e Ne e d Despite the need at times to move quickly to prevent genocide, “ethnic cleansing,” and crimes against humanity, the United Nations has no reliable capacity to move promptly, even if halting a catastrophe could save hundreds of thousands of lives. Genocide in Rwanda illustrates this incapacity, as do the massive killings of innocent people in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, the Sudan, and elsewhere. The time has come to create a permanent UN Emergency Peace Service to ensure that the next preventable humanitarian disaster will not occur. If such a service had been established earlier, it could have prevented many of the atrocities that have killed millions of civilians, wounded millions more, forced tens of millions from their homes, destroyed entire economies, and wasted hundreds of billions of dollars. Of course such a service would not be a panacea for security problems in general; indeed it would be designed to complement — not replace — other essential national, regional, and United Nations efforts. Yet an emergency service could provide immediate, full protection in some crises and serve as an advance peace service that would prepare the way for subsequent additional help, if needed, in larger conflicts — a vital function that is not provided by any existing agency. Such a service could also help address extreme environmental and natural disasters in cases where other remedies are inadequate for averting major threats to human life. Th e Pr o p o s a l Because a UN emergency service would be permanent, based at UN designated sites, and include mobile field headquarters, it could move to quell an emergency within 48 hours after United Nations authorization. Since it would be individually recruited from among volunteers from many countries, it would not suffer the reluctance of UN members to deploy their own national units. As its 10,000 to 15,000 personnel would be carefully selected, expertly trained, and coherently organized and commanded, it would not fail in its mission due to lack of skills, equipment, cohesiveness, experience in resolving conflicts, or gender, national, or religious imbalance. Because it would be an integrated service encompassing civilian, police, judicial, and military personnel prepared to conduct multiple functions in diverse UN operations, it would not suffer for lack of components essential to peace operations or from confusion about the chain of command. By providing a wide range of functions, the UN emergency service would, for the first time in history, offer a rapid, comprehensive, internationally legitimate response to crisis. 135
Defence Forces Review 2008 Th e Pl a n o f Ac t i o n Because governments have not created the necessary UN capability, the responsibility for breathing life into the United Nations Emergency Peace Service now lies with civil society, working with allies in the UN and interested governments. To create this service, a growing number of citizens’ organizations and leaders of civil society are determined to: (1) identify interested parties throughout the world to expand the number and diversity of those committed to this initiative; (2) secure agreement on the principles, composition, and financing of a UN emergency service; (3) draw on expert knowledge to ensure that the growing constituency is accurately informed and to write detailed plans for the emergency service and how to establish it; (4) develop a well-organized network of support with a compelling website, promotional materials, list of endorsements, and speakers’ bureau; and (5) encourage a wide consultative process among non-governmental organizations, the UN system, and national governments to ensure the implementation of a successful strategy. Pr o p o s a l f o r a Un i t e d Na t i o n s Em e r g e n c y Pe a c e Se r v i c e t o Pr e v e n t Ge n o c i d e a n d Cr i m e s a g a i n s t Hu m a n i t y i 1 Th e Ne e d Despite the need to be able to move quickly to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity, the United Nations has no capacity to avert such catastrophes, even when prompt action could save hundreds of thousands of lives. The international community’s failure to stop genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and to avert “ethnic cleansing” occurring in the Darfur region of Sudan a decade later illustrate this incapacity, as do the other massive killings of civilians in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and elsewhere. In recent years, huge atrocities have killed millions of innocent people, wounded millions more, forced tens of millions from their homes, destroyed entire economies, and wasted hundreds of billions of dollars. After witnessing genocide, everyone promises: “Never again.” But mass murder has happened again, and yet again. The time to stop it has come, at least in all those instances where the international community could have a reasonable probability of success. Yet existing international capabilities are simply unable to meet this responsibility. “Too little, too late” has become the rule rather than the exception. As the UN Secretary-General has warned, without serious reforms and institutional innovation, the United Nations will be unable to prevent future human catastrophes 2 . The conscience of every human being should be shocked and aroused by the international community’s inability to quell atrocities in Darfur ten years after the lessons “learned” in Rwanda 3 . Although many factors cause “too little, too late,” a single innovation could address most of them: the creation of a permanent UN Emergency Peace Service to protect those victimized by war, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Such a service could save millions of lives and billions of dollars, while also advancing the rule of law against heinous crimes. Of course it would not be a panacea for security problems in general; indeed its purpose is to complement—not replace—other essential national, regional, and United Nations efforts. Yet 136
Page 2:
Óglaigh na hÉireann Defence Force
Page 6:
Editor’s Note On 28 June 1958 Iri
Page 10 and 11:
Table of Contents Article Title Pag
Page 12 and 13:
Punching Above Our Weight Punching
Page 14 and 15:
Punching Above Our Weight was now c
Page 16 and 17:
Punching Above Our Weight attacks o
Page 18 and 19:
Punching Above Our Weight It is the
Page 20 and 21:
Punching Above Our Weight 17 Statem
Page 22 and 23:
Ireland’s first engagement in Uni
Page 24 and 25:
Page 26 and 27:
Page 28 and 29:
Page 30 and 31:
Page 32 and 33:
Page 34 and 35:
Lessons from The Congo Lessons from
Page 36 and 37:
Lessons from The Congo antagonistic
Page 38 and 39:
Lessons from The Congo When McKeown
Page 40 and 41:
Lessons from The Congo The besieged
Page 42 and 43:
Lessons from The Congo The biggest
Page 44 and 45:
At-Tiri, or Bosnia Avoided : The Ir
Page 46 and 47:
Page 48 and 49:
Page 50 and 51:
Page 52 and 53:
Page 54 and 55:
Page 56 and 57:
Healer of the Nation Healer of the
Page 58 and 59:
Healer of the Nation The Irish food
Page 60 and 61:
Healer of the Nation I have given t
Page 62 and 63:
‘Bullets, Bacteria and Boredom’
Page 64 and 65:
Page 66 and 67:
Page 68 and 69:
Page 70 and 71:
The Nobel Lecture - 9 January 1989
Page 72 and 73:
Page 74 and 75:
Page 76 and 77:
Boots on the Ground and the Complex
Page 78 and 79:
Page 80 and 81:
Page 82 and 83:
United Nations in a Divided World U
Page 84 and 85:
United Nations in a Divided World t
Page 86 and 87:
United Nations in a Divided World T
Page 88 and 89:
United Nations in a Divided World i
Page 90 and 91:
United Nations in a Divided World c
Page 92 and 93:
Lessons from Kosovo Lessons from Ko
Page 94 and 95:
Lessons from Kosovo responsibility
Page 96 and 97: Lessons from Kosovo The Brahimi Rep
Page 98 and 99: Lessons from Kosovo the option of d
Page 100 and 101: Lessons from Kosovo There is now be
Page 102 and 103: Lessons from Kosovo fulfilled. It i
Page 104 and 105: Lessons from Kosovo 17 R. Murphy,
Page 106 and 107: Balkan Dilemma Balkan Dilemma Antho
Page 108 and 109: Balkan Dilemma geographical proximi
Page 110 and 111: Balkan Dilemma undertake the re-uni
Page 112 and 113: Balkan Dilemma During the entire co
Page 114 and 115: Balkan Dilemma consider the UN and
Page 116 and 117: Balkan Dilemma I am aware that the
Page 118 and 119: ‘New’ versus ‘No’ World Ord
Page 126 and 127: UNMIL - A UN Success Story UNMIL -
Page 128 and 129: UNMIL - A UN Success Story personne
Page 130 and 131: UNMIL - A UN Success Story Stedman
Page 132 and 133: UNMIL - A UN Success Story DDR 35 D
Page 134 and 135: UNMIL - A UN Success Story The prov
Page 136 and 137: UNMIL - A UN Success Story unmilR.h
Page 138 and 139: The Process of Reform in United Nat
Page 148 and 149: A United Nations Emergency Peace Se
Page 162 and 163: The Future of Peacekeeping The Futu
Page 164 and 165: The Future of Peacekeeping and East
Page 166 and 167: The Future of Peacekeeping multilat
Page 168 and 169: ‘Carlsberg don’t do Peacekeepin
Page 176 and 177: Short Biographical Statement Short
Page 178 and 179: Short Biographical Statement unsucc
Page 180 and 181: Short Biographical Statement 11. Co
show all

Defence Forces Review 2008

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?