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Lessons from Kosovo<br />

17<br />

R. Murphy, ‘UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon and the Use of Force’ (1999) 6(2) International Peacekeeping 38-<br />

63; and N. D. White, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (2nd edn,<br />

Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 241.<br />

18<br />

Letter dated 17 November from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc.<br />

S/2004/932 30 November 2004.<br />

19<br />

Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 10 June 1999.<br />

20<br />

Kosovo-Kosova, As Seen , As Told, OSCE, 1999, p. xii.<br />

21<br />

W. O’Neill, Kosovo – An Unfinished Peace, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper, Lynne Rienner<br />

(2002), p. 46.<br />

22<br />

Reuters, 22 October 1999.<br />

23<br />

See for example, Human Rights Watch, Abuses Against Serbs and Roma in the New Kosovo, (August, 1999). On<br />

27 October 1999, an Albanian mob of around one thousand attacked a KFOR protected convoy of Serbs leaving<br />

Kosovo. Many were injured, and KFOR failed to protect those fleeing as required by the Resolution 1244. The fact<br />

that the Serbs were leaving in the first place is clear evidence of the failure to provide a secure environment. See<br />

also Human Rights Watch, Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo (March, 2004).<br />

24<br />

International Crisis Group, Who`s Killing Whom in Kosovo, Balkans Report No. 78, 2 November 1999, p. 14.<br />

25<br />

Ibid., p. 17. There were also calls by the ICG for KFOR to clamp down on the remaining structures of the Kosovo<br />

Liberation Army, and to monitor closely the KPC.<br />

26<br />

See generally ‘Peace Support Operations’ in the International Committee of the Red Cross, Model Manual of the<br />

Law of Armed Conflict, (Geneva, ICRC, 1999), paras. 2024-2027; G. Bowens, Legal Guide to Peace Support<br />

Operations (US Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1998), pp. 185-202; J. Simpson, Law Applicable to Canadian <strong>Forces</strong><br />

in Somalia 1992/93: A study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian <strong>Forces</strong><br />

in Somalia (Ottawa, Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), pp. 35-39; P. Rowe, ‘Maintaining<br />

Discipline in United Nations Peace Support Operations: The Legal Quagmire for Military Contingents’ (2000)<br />

5(1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 45-62 at 59; Rules of Engagement (ROE) for Judge Advocates, Center<br />

for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO), 1 May 2000; Operational Law Handbook 2002, International and<br />

Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocates General’s School, US Army, (2002), 67-100; and T. Findlay,<br />

‘The Use of Force in Self-<strong>Defence</strong>’, 51-75, at 52 and 55.<br />

27<br />

UNMIK Press Release, UNMIK/PR/263, 2 June 2000.<br />

28<br />

See Towards a European vision for use of land forces Multinationality and interoperability within the framework<br />

of operational missions ranging from high to low intensity (from combat to peace support), (France: CDES<br />

Doctrine Forum, 2001), p. 18.<br />

29<br />

Personal interview, senior Irish officer, Dublin, September 2004.<br />

30<br />

Analysis of the March 2004 events by military officer present titled “What went wrong and why it will happen<br />

again”, anonymous, 2004.<br />

31<br />

See comments by General Gaviard, Towards a European vision for use of land forces CDES Doctrine Forum,<br />

2001, p. 47.<br />

32<br />

See Col. C. Dunlap, ‘US Legal Issues in Coalition Operations’, pp. 3-4.<br />

33<br />

See comments by General Tieszen, Towards a European vision for use of land forces, CDES Doctrine Forum,<br />

2001 p. 48.<br />

34<br />

Brahimi Report, part 2, para. 49.<br />

35<br />

Ibid.<br />

36<br />

Ibid.<br />

37<br />

There were 730 Serb, Ashkali and Roma homes damaged or destroyed, up to ten public buildings, and 30 Serbian<br />

churches and two monasteries damaged or destroyed. UN Doc. S/2004/348, Report of the Secretary-General on the<br />

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 30 April 2004, para. 3.<br />

38<br />

International Crisis Group, Kosovo’s Linchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica, Balkans Report No. 96, 31<br />

May 2000, p. 10.<br />

39<br />

Reuters, ‘U.N. Agency Threatens to Suspend Operations in Kosovo Area,’ New York Times, 4 May 2000.<br />

40<br />

International Crisis Group, Collapse in Kosovo, Europe Report No. 155, 22 April 2004, p. 17.<br />

41<br />

Ibid., p. 19<br />

42<br />

See Jean-Endes Barbier, ‘Smouldering Serb village in Kosovo gutted in sight of NATO peacekeepers’, Agence<br />

France Presse, 21 March 2004, N. Wood, ‘Kosovo Smoulders After Mob Violence’, New York Times, 24 March<br />

2004, p. 10.<br />

93

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