Defence Forces Review 2008

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The Future of Peacekeeping The Future of Peacekeeping 1 Dr Jean-Marc Coicaud Director UN University Office, New York Peace operations continue to be one of the most visible areas of activity of the United Nations, one which the international organization can have a critical impact. Consider, for instance, that peacekeeping operations are growing. In October 2004, the surge in peacekeeping activity raised the number of peacekeepers to 54,200. The number of civilian police also increased to 5,900 and the civilian staff to 11,600. By the fall of 2005, the 18 operations around the world employed 83,000 troops, police, and civilian personnel – a more-or-less fivefold increase in the field personnel since 2000. By the fall of 2006, the deployment number had reached an all-time high of 93,000 men and women. At the same time, peacekeeping operations are becoming more complex and comprehensive. In particular, with many of their tasks increasingly focusing on peacebuilding in post-conflict transitions, peace operations are now linked to longer-term development approaches, which call for integrated programs both within and outside the UN system. The UN Peacebuilding Commission was created to meet these new needs by strategically coordinating the actions of the different actors involved in peacekeeping. Although peacekeeping operations are growing in size and complexity, they have not experienced an equivalent increase in political and financial support from member countries. The leading Western powers remain reluctant to take a leading role in expanding UN operations. The current U.S. ambivalence toward the UN is perhaps the most crippling factor. And unfortunately, that ambivalence is not likely to undergo a fundamental shift any time soon. Up h i l l Ba t t l e Despite the expansion of operations, the peacekeeping picture is not an entirely rosy one. The challenges are multifold. They entail the limited resources that peacekeeping mobilizes, the way it functions (or not), and how it is being called upon by member states. In fact, peacekeeping is so much of an uphill battle that its capacity to address the security and humanitarian crises associated with failed or failing states is questionable. In recent years Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the current under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations, has repeatedly said that issues of resources and modus operandi are critical for peacekeeping and yet so difficult to address in a satisfactory manner. Indeed, getting the right capabilities, including troops, specialized components, and other personnel, on the ground to implement the mandates, making them available not simply over the duration of the missions but also in the early, crucial phase of deployment, can mean the difference between success and failure. But all too often such capabilities are not found, let alone on time. For instance, the UN/African Union “hybrid” mission for Darfur (UNAMID) has been badly hurt 151
Defence Forces Review 2008 by the refusal of militarily capable nations to provide the two dozens helicopters required, at the least, for operations in Darfur. No NATO country has offered even one helicopter. Equally if not more challenging are the organizing of these capabilities in the field and the integrating and rationalizing of the joint efforts of the UN system and the rest of the international community to assist the consolidation of a sustainable peace by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This state of affairs derives from operational difficulties specific to UN peacekeeping, such as the challenge of solving the discrepancy between the financing of different activities for today’s complex operations. For example, certain activities are traditionally covered by assessed contributions, while reconstruction or development activity must rely on voluntary contributions. Integrating and rationalizing peacekeeping activities is also hampered by the lack of systematically accumulated knowledge of lessons learned. Although the UN has been doing peacekeeping, including conflict prevention, for more than 50 years, its ad hoc approach tends to deprive it of time-tested templates on how to proceed to secure success. But it is the attitude of member states toward peacekeeping that is perhaps the biggest obstacle. First, member states tend to ask the UN to handle security and humanitarian crises that they do not want to tackle themselves. In this regard, UN peacekeeping appears sometimes to be a dumping ground for the most enduring problems. Second, while member states are quick to hand over problems to the UN, they resist giving appropriate resources to address them. Beyond the adoption of resolutions in the Security Council, they are often unwilling to offer sufficient political, financial, logistical, or military support. Against this background, and considering that the crises on which UN peacekeeping operations focus are usually part and parcel of intractable conflicts, it is no surprise that they have mixed results. The attitude of the permanent members of the Security Council occupies a prime of place in this context. And, more specifically, as Russia and China are still in the back seat when it comes to UN peace operations – although in recent years China has increased its contribution to UN peacekeeping and became in 2006 the 13th-largest contributor of UN peacekeepers – this concerns first and foremost the three Western permanent members of the Council. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, United Kingdom, and France have been the most active in peacekeeping. But they have measured their involvement against a narrowly understood national interest. As a result, their support has been at best tentative and at worst crippled by a reluctance to take much risk. In this ambiguous commitment of leading Western powers to UN peace operations, the United States has a central role. Indeed, if there is one country that wrestles with the challenge of balancing obligations that the national and international realms entail, it is America. Am e r i c a n Am b i v a l e n c e In the 1990s, the United States, without a doubt, had a positive impact on the search for solutions to humanitarian crises. In most instances with international involvement, America’s role proved to be essential. Although never as decisive as in more traditional types of conflict such as Operation Desert Storm, U.S. participation was decisive enough at least to get the international community engaged in the crises. This was particularly true for Bosnia, Kosovo, 152
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