Defence Forces Review 2008

Defence Forces Review 2008
evacuated, but their homes and property were then destroyed. KFOR was unable or unwilling
to respond appropriately; there were no apparent standard operating procedures or contingency
plan to cope with the situation that arose. The use of force ROE proved unworkable and KFOR
failed to provide the secure environment it was charged with creating and maintaining.
There was a failure to anticipate the trouble, despite evidence that individual military and police
officers could see what was coming. In addition, no reinforcements were sent to support those
deployed at key flash points and the so-called chain of command failed to function. Sheer
numbers were also a problem: KFOR had been reduced from around 45000 to 17500, with
further troop cuts planned, and so fixed positions such as checkpoints had been replaced by
less labour intensive mobile patrols. Moreover, many duties formerly undertaken by UNMIK
police were delegated to the Kosovo Police Service, which was just not ready for the job.
Numbers were also asserted to have played a part when it was widely reported that French
KFOR troops failed to protect the village of Svinjare, a few hundred metres from their logistical
base. 42 Despite having received a two hour warning, the French subsequently claimed that
they had too few troops to respond; as a result, Serb property was either looted or destroyed.
In Prizren, German KFOR troops were unable to prevent the Orthodox churches, seminary
buildings and monasteries from being laid waste. Individual Serb houses were also destroyed.
The nature of many of the locations targeted did make them exceptionally difficult to protect,
whereas the village of Svinjare could have be defended with relative ease. It seemed that the
rioters knew exactly how far to go without provoking the German soldiers into shooting. In
the Irish area of responsibility, members of minority communities were given reassurances
by KFOR troops and stayed put. In this instance, KFOR did fulfil its mandate to protect such
communities. These developments compromise the long-term impartiality of KFOR.
The legacy of the March 2004 violence was not just the loss of credibility by UNMIK and
KFOR, but also the bitter recriminations that followed between the various branches of the
UN operation. There was reference made to the ‘Srebrenica syndrome’ amongst KFOR troops
to the effect that if you do not have enough troops you just give in instead of standing your
ground. This begs the question, what military commander ever considered he or she had
sufficient troops or resources
KFOR lost face in Kosovo and in the eyes of the international community as a whole. In response
to intimidation and the threat of violence, the international security presence relinquished a
significant amount of its authority to the extremists. Another consequence of the March rioting
and the failure to respond appropriately is that KFOR was left a less unified force.
The vulnerability of KFOR was exposed. UNMIK and KFOR operate in a quasi-hostile
environment. KFOR was shown not to be able to protect the Serb minority and a ‘humanitarian
intervention’ by Serbian forces to protect this group must be considered a future possibility.
There was a significant contrast in the policy adopted by different contingents. The British
contingent adopted a flexible, but aggressive no nonsense approach. They worked on the
ground in small units, an approach that maximises visibility amongst the local population and
confers a degree of autonomy on relatively low ranking personnel, enabling them to respond
immediately and appropriately to whatever situation arises. This concept of operations retained
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